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Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: 
How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary 
Default Rule For Interpretation 1 
Juliet P. Kostritsky2 
W ITHOUT interpretation many contracts would remain uncertain of meaning and incapable of enforcement. Courts interpreting contracts 
must grapple with what the words of a contract mean as well as how to 
make that determination.3 These questions are likely to be troubling when 
the plaintiff and defendant have dueling interpretations of the meaning of 
a contract's terms.4 
The problem of contract interpretation presents courts with significant 
questions about the nature and methodology of judicial intervention into 
private arrangements. The court often assumes an active role in interpreting 
the words of a written contract5 in part because words have more than 
one meaning or because a contract is incomplete.6 When a court chooses 
amongst variable meanings, or interprets contracts to craft limitations 
on parties' behavior when express limits do not exist, its choice must be 
justified using a justificative framework explored below. 
Traditionally, commentators have advocated one of two general 
approaches to supply the methodology to govern judicial choices of 
contract meaning. 7 The first restricts interpretation to the words used in 
I This article was selected by the Program Commirree of the American Law and 
Economics Association for presentation at the annual meeting of the American La~ and 
Economics Association that was held MayS and 6, 2007 at Harvard Law School and presented 
on May 6, 2007. 
2 John Homer Kapp Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. I am grateful for helpful comments from Professors Ronald J. Coffey, Peter M. Gerhart 
and Avery Katz. I am grateful for the research assistance provided by Michael Dory (J.D. 
University of Chicago Law School 2007). 
3 Judges or juries or arbitrators make these determinations. See Richard A. Posner, The 
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEx. L. REv. IS8J, I s8z (zoos). Interpretation 
must precede any judicial determination of whether a breach has occurred and what perfor-
mance is due under the terms of the contract. 
4 Of course without "a real uncertainty about meaning, the challenge [of plaintiff or de-
fendant] will present no interesting question of interpretation." !d. 
s Steven Shavell, On the Writi11g and the lnterpretatiotJ of Contracts, 22 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 
289, 290 (zoos). 
6 See i11fra note 42. 
7 These approaches assume that the difference in meaning has not prevented contract 
formation. If the variability is roo great and there is no way for a court ro choose, it may find 
43 
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the contract and the other accepts extrinsic evidence about what one or 
both of the parties to the contract intended that the words would mean 
or objective evidence of the meaning supplied by context8 or evidence of 
how ordinary commercial parties in a trade used the term or behaved in the 
current contract.9 
This article argues that it is wrong to think that courts must make a 
dichotomous choice always to prefer extrinsic evidence or always to exclude 
it. 10 Sometimes the appropriate interpretive methodology should explicitly 
forego extrinsic evidence while at other times it should embrace extrinsic 
evidence. The choice between the two methodologies should depend upon 
an assessment in each case about which interpretive methodology is most 
likely to (1) curb opportunistic behavior; and (2) implement the parties' 
actual intentions and overall goals, 11 in a cost-effective way to maximize 
gains from trade. 12 
The drive to curb opportunism under conditions of bounded rationality 
has been the focus of much of the work in new institutional economics 
no contract. See i11jra note 39· 
8 See supra note 3· 
9 The primary proponents of this broader approach were Corbin and Traynor. Avery 
Katz, The Ecouomics of Fom1 aud Substa11ce i11 Co11tract fllterpretatioll, 104 CoLUM. L. REv. 496, 
50I (2004). 
10 The dichotomous approach may be thought of more flexibly when thought of "in 
probabilistic terms" (with some regimes more willing to admit a broader base of context evi-
dence and other regimes less likely to do so).fd. at 517. 
Professor Avery Katz similarly rejects the dichotomous choice and suggests that the 
choice of interpretation for parries will depend on matters such as the degree of risk averse-
ness of the parries (with more risk averse parries favoring substantive interpretation since 
that approach reduces risk of improper interpretation), the transaction costs both ex aute and 
ex post (with formality being preferred where circumstances require quick decision-making), 
effect of interpretation on performance incentives (with direction being paid to inefficient 
precautions from erroneous interpretation), effect of ex post renegotiation costs (with formality 
dominating when parties can renegotiate at low cost to achieve efficient results), presence of 
reliance-based transaction-specific investments (with substantive interpretation being pre-
ferred where it can reduce the risk of hold up following investment), the relative presence 
of rent-seeking at the ex a11te and ex post stage of contracting (with formality being preferred 
where rent seeking ex post likely and vice versa), the presence of "small and infrequent trad-
ers" (with substantive interpretation being preferred due to the inability to recoup the up front 
"fixed" cost of negotiation over a large number of transactions), and the robustness of internal 
sanctioning networks. !d. at 525-36. 
I r In some cases actual intentions may not exist and the court will then look to the par-
ries' overall goals, including joint wealth maximization. 
I 2 Courts seeking an interpretive methodology should strive to save parties drafting 
costs while not increasing enforcement costs by an amount in the excess of the amount saved 
in drafting costs. See Posner, supra note 3, at 1583 (explaining that "[b]ecause methods for re-
ducing contractual transaction costs, such as litigation, are themselves costly, careful tradeoffs 
are required"). 
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on rationalizing governance structures. 13 These works seek to explain the 
"organizational imperative" to control opportunism in a cost-effective way, 
particularly where specific asset investment makes a simple exit from a 
contract relationship costly. 14 This paper presents an analytical framework 
for choosing an interpretive methodology that can curb opportunism and 
implement the parties' goals to maximize joint gains. It is associated 
with the law and economics branch of contract theory and thus seeks 
interpretive rules that will maximize15 ex ante efficiency. However, it posits 
that to achieve those goals and efficiency, courts must do more than promote 
standardization through giving judicial approval of a predefined set of 
"contractual signals for future parties" 16 through law-supplied.default terms 
and interpret terms to recognize private efforts to trump the state-supplied 
terms "when necessary to avoid an ill-fitting [state] formulation." 17 Courts 
must be willing to actively interpret contracts to curb opportunism even if 
it does not result in a stock of standardized terms that all parties can use in 
future contracts. 
Of course, the parties are always free to choose the interpretive 
methodology that a court should use to interpret the contract. 18 That choice 
might seem to obviate the need for a methodology to guide courts. Parties 
could, for example, control the interpretive process in part by limiting 
interpretation to the actual words of the contract, including a merger clause 
that would theoretically restrict the court's role to the written document. 19 
This does not solve the interpretive problem, however. The parties 
often do not so specify, in which case courts must adopt an interpretive 
methodology that not only supplies that term but also appreciates the fact 
that the parties failed to do so. Moreover, even when the parties supply 
an interpretive methodology, perhaps by including a merger clause that 
restricts extrinsic evidence,Z0 that provision must itself be interpreted and 
I3 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM FIRMS, 
MARKETS AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 32 (I 985). 
I4 ld. 
IS Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism i11 Relotio11ol Coutroa, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 
849 (2000). 
I6 ld. 
I 7 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expouded Choice: Au Au a lysis of the 
luteroaiou Betwem E:>.press oud Implied Coutroct Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 26I, 28I (I985). 
I 8 Professor Avery Katz focuses on these types of parties' private choices in interpretive 
methodology and proposes a "taxonomy of economic considerations" that will affect parties' 
choices between a more formal and more substantive method. Katz, supra note 9, at 500. 
I9ld.at5I9. 
20 This clause indicates to courts that a contract is completely integrated. If the court 
accepts that proposition, the merger clause will bar the admissibility of any extrinsic evi-
dence, whether to supplement or to contradict the written contract. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, 
CoNTRACTs § 7·3 (4th ed., 2004). 
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there are often exceptions that are crafted by courts, providing an occasion 
for judicial interpretation. 
Whether a court is interpreting the words of the contract or the interpretive 
directions of the parties or filling a gap in a contract, the methodology the 
court uses should not be artificially separated from a normative theory 
that will identify interpretations that will be value maximizing for the 
parties. Nor can a court isolate the interpretive question from the context 
of the problems that the contractual language was crafted to solve or the 
transaction costs associated with crafting solutions to those problems. 21 The 
interpretive process must therefore start by understanding the normative 
justification for any judicial intervention in private arrangements, paying 
attention to the bargaining problems that parties face, including the costs of 
anticipating future contingencies and future behaviors, the potential gains 
from effectively controlling opportunism (and the deadweight loss from 
failing to control it),Z2 while minimizing the costs of doing so, including the 
likely error and litigation costs from particular interpretive approaches in 
particular types of contexts dealing with parties' various problems. 
The role of courts in contract cases is to preserve the autonomy of the 
parties by preserving the bargain they negotiated and maximizing the 
returns from the bargain. If, however, a contract is incomplete in ways 
that will be explored in this article, the court will have to judge, using 
an appropriate interpretive methodology, how to minimize occasions for 
opportunism by the parties23 while simultaneously minimizing drafting 
costs for the parties and enforcement costs. 24 Opportunism is a threat e;t 
ante to the bargainers' ability (and the ability of other potential contracting 
parties) to maximize their gains from trade. Opportunism is the enemy of 
bargains and of efforts to achieve the maximum benefits of bargains. 
Alternative goals of contract interpretation that vie with curbing 
opportunistic behavior include: "uniformly [i.e., predictably] interpreting 
the contract terms chosen by contracting parties" and "standardization" 
2 I Schwartz and Scott emphasize the importance of goal achievemeni:, including surplus 
maximization, in the interpretation process but they emphasize the need whew strictly to the 
"parties' solution" in order w implement that goal. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scot[, Co11tract 
Theory a11d the Limits ojCo11tract Law, I I3 YALE L.J. 54 I, 569 (2003). 
22 Deadweight loss refers w the aggregate shortfall members would suffer "from a fail-
ure W cooperate." ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 172 (1991). If parties could control opportunism, they might avoid these losses 
because they would contract in cases where they would refuse w contract were the opportun-
ism uncontrolled. 
23 Robert E. Scot[, The U11ijormity Norm i11 Commercial Law, i11 ThE JuRISPRUDENTIAL 
FoUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT AND CoMMERCIAL LAW 152 (Kraus & Walt, eds., zooo). 
24 There is always a tradeoff. If courts intervene with terms that save parties drafting 
costs, rhe courr should be aware that it should not intervene if the cosr of enforcement that 
comes from having w actively interpret a term (or fill a gap) outweighs any savings in drafting 
costs w the parties. See Posner, s11pra nore 3· 
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of terms.25 To achieve standardization, courts interpret express terms in 
such a way as to permit deviations and that deviation then becomes a new 
default rule. 26 These new defaults can be invoked by parties in future 
contracts. 
This article posits that the function of the courts in interpreting contracts 
should include a third goal of discouraging opportunistic behavior as a 
means of maximizing gains from trade and controlling deadweight losses. 
In some ways these different goals of commercial law courts may seem 
inherently contradictory. How can terms have any predictable meaning if 
the court "interprets" fixed quantity to mean flexible quantity and thereby 
creates a new default? However, if courts are sensitive to how the goals can 
be achieved in each case and when one goal should be trumped by another 
goal, courts can continue to promote the values that are important to the 
parties. For example, in some cases discouraging opportunism will require 
a court to hew carefully to the textual language, simultaneously fostering 
predictability. In other cases discouraging opportunism, especially in 
incomplete contracts, will require courts to interpret the contract broadly. 
Although that approach might arguably impair predictability and autonomy, 
since the express terms constitute an empty shell and leave certain matters 
unresolved, the courts cannot simply enforce the express terms as a way 
of promoting autonomy. Instead, the court has to address whether broad 
interpretation and Jaw-supplied terms should be embraced as a means of 
increasing the autonomy by increasing the range of outcomes that the parties 
can achieve in the face of contracting difficulties. Insistence on adherence 
to express language should give way to controlling opportunism. Otherwise, 
textualism would simply be a vehicle for promoting unbargained-for gains 
for the opportunistic party. 
Opportunism arises because parties Jack foresight about the future, and 
because bargaining over possible future contingencies and adding language 
to contracts is expensiveY As the context for contractual performance 
changes, the costs and benefits of the original bargain change and one 
party or the other may have an incentive to seek to change the nature of 
the bargain to take advantage of those circumstances by interpreting its 
obligations in a certain way. Opportunism also arises when one party has 
the discretion (whether or not made explicit) due to incompleteness that 
allows that party to make choices in an opportunistic fashion. 
25 Scott, supra note 23, at 152. 
26 id. 
27 Iris not just the time and expense of bargaining; it is also rhe wasted time of planning 
for a contingency that may never occur. These cosrs of writing contracts may mean rhat the 
optimal method of interpretation is a superior approach ro literal enforcement since ir will 
~elieve the parries of writing rerms, though rhis result may nor hold rrue when "interpretation 
Involves a cost." Shavell, supra note 5, ar 301. 
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The relationship between the court's interpretive function and the role 
of courts in developing methodologies that reduce opportunism is symbiotic. 
Opportunism is made possible by the inability of the bargaining parties 
to specify their obligations in light of future contingencies and behavioral 
choices, and this in turn drives the need to have an interpretation of the 
contract in order to determine obligations in a way that curbs opportunism 
in light of those contingencies and choices. 
An opportunistic party may use court interpretation by seeking to have 
a term interpreted to its advantage and to the disadvantage of both the 
other party and to the integrity of the original bargain. Sometimes this 
takes the form of an argument that a term should be interpreted according 
to its common or plain meaning. At other times it comes in the form of 
an argument that extrinsic evidence about the meaning of the rerm should 
be admi.tted. That is why the goal of curbing opportunism cannot be 
taken to call for either one interpretive approach or another. The choice 
of approach must take into account the opportunism that is presented by 
different interpretive claims (perhaps by both parties) and that is therefore 
best placed to restore the parties to the position they would have taken at 
the time of the original bargain or to curb the problem of opportunism, a 
goal that both parties would subscribe to ex a11te. 28 
The courts demonstrate a willingness to consider (at least implicitly) 
the opportunism problem in interpretation. They are more willing to call 
a contract unambiguous and needing no extrinsic evidence when the party 
attempting to introduce extrinsic evidence appears to be trying to get an 
unbargained for advantage.29 The converse is also true. Courts are more 
willing to admit extrinsic evidence when the party insisting on the formal 
language of the contract is acting opportunistically. 30 
To provide guidance to courts interpreting contracts, this article will 
provide a series of heuristics.31 
28 Ex post, of course, a party rna y prefer w act opportunistically w expropriate a large 
share of the gains. WILLIAMSON, supra note 13, at 63. 
29 See e.g., Dixon, Odom & Co. v. Sledge, 296 S.E.zd 512 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (court 
unwilling w admit evidence of meaning of term "former diem" when former partner trying to 
escape contractual obligations to partnership). 
30 See e.g., Local Am. Bank of Tulsa v. U.S., 52 Fed. Cl. 184 (2002) (court willing to admit 
evidence on understanding of how long tax benefit would last when party opposing introduc-
tion of evidence crying to opportunistically deny a tax benefit chat was critical to the success 
of the deal). 
31 Ocher efforts to provide heuristics to guide courts in the interpretation of contracts 
include: Katz, supra note 9, at 536 (outlining criteria relevant to choosing between formal 
and comexrualized interpretive approaches); BENJAMIN E. HERMALIN ET AL., The Law and 
Economics of Contracting 86 in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND EcoNOMICS available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abscract=907678 (forthcoming 2007) (detailing factors that would make either formal or sub-
stantive approach to interpretation economically efficient). The availability of heuristics may 
help w alleviate some concerns that courts might lack the capability to engage in substantive 
interpretacion because of the greater burdens that such interpretation would place on the 
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I. THE INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM 
When interpreting a contract's express terms, it is tempting to think that 
the words of the contract are self-defining. If words and terms were so, 
problems of interpretation would never arise. It is often a mistake to think 
of words as self-evident, for words are not always an exact expression of 
the party's intention (perhaps because of inartful drafting)32 and are often 
susceptible of several meanings, some of which reflect fidelity to the original 
bargain, and some of which reflect an opportunistic attempt to reformulate 
the original agreement.33 In some cases the parties have not formulated an 
intention so there is no true intention to which the interpretation should 
remain faithful. When there is no actual intention and the meaning remains 
uncertain, a party may try to take advantage of the other party by exercising 
discretion under the terms in a way that does not promote joint gains. In 
still other cases parties may use "broad" terms that might or might not be 
intended to apply in different future scenariosY Here the parties simply 
have not formulated an intention ex ante on which particular meaning will 
prevail in what circumstances. For each case in which intention was not 
formulated, a court must decide what is permitted when the words often 
provide no solution. 
If the parties had been able to anticipate the future and advert to 
the way contingencies would develop and choices that would have to be 
made, they could have crafted specific language that took account of the 
future and opportunistic manipulation would not be possible. Where the 
agreement does not resolve, address or advert to the manner in which a 
party might perform his contractual obligations, however, interpretation is 
required. 
The nature of the court's role may be affected by the source of the 
interpretive problem. If the problem is one of disputed meaning, the 
court's role might involve a translation role in which the court's job is to 
court. See Discussion with Professor Paul G. Mahoney, at the University of Virginia at the 
American Law & Economics Association Annual Meeting (May 6, 2007). 
32 Professors Goetz and Scott refer this as a "definitional process [that] requires parties 
to employ inherently error-prone signals-the 'formulations' of their agreement." Goetz & 
Scott, supra note 17, at 262. This potential for drafting error "threatens [the] 'reliability"' of 
the contract. /d. at 265. This article broadens the interpretation problem to go beyond mere 
translation problems created by formulating words to reflect intentions and argues that the 
fact that the future is unknowable creates another layer of difficulty for parties choosing terms. 
In some sense, when they choose terms unaware of the future, the terms will be incomplete. 
Then, when courts "interpret" the terms, there is not only the problem that there may be a 
divergence between the parties' actual intention and interpretation but a larger problem of 
interpreting words when there was no actual intention formed to begin with. 
33 Goetz & Scott, supra note 17, at 266 (discussing errors in interpretation that diverge 
from the intended meaning as "the risk of unintended effects"). As they point out, these ef-
fects are partly the result of giving parties the free choice to pick their own terms. Jd. at 267. 
34 See Shave]], supra note 5, at 289 (discussing use of broad terms). 
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identify the original deal and detect opportunistic attempts to rewrite that 
deal. The language may clearly cover a contingency and one party may 
defend arguing that it "never thought the language [it] agreed to would 
[be such a] disadvantage." 35 If the situation is one that is covered by the 
language and is not a new or unanticipated circumstance in which the 
language is to operate, courts should and do easily dispose of an argument 
that the court should not interpret the language as it was intended to 
operate. In so doing, courts can curb opportunistic attempts to subvert the 
original understanding.36 When the source of the interpretive problem is 
the negligent use of words, the law may seek to provide efficient incentives 
for more careful drafting to ensure that the words accurately express intent, 
at least if there is a party who clearly could have avoided the ambiguity.37 
In these cases the view is that the courts should allocate the loss to the least 
cost avoider because doing so will maximize the surplus for future parties 
in similar situations.38 When the parties, however, serendipitously end up 
having different subjective meanings and neither party is blamable, the 
law generally takes a hands-off attitude and finds no contract was formed. 
In such cases there is no basis for supposing that legal intervention in the 
contract will improve welfare for the parties.39 
However, when the source of the interpretive problem is the lack of 
foresight about the future, 40 attempts at opportunism and interpretation 
problems arise that are not likely to be resolved by a careful adherence to 
35 This argument may be implicit in a statement that the effect of a particular interpreta-
tion is absurd or unreasonable. 
36 SeeWaina v.Abdallah, 2oo6 Ohio App. LEXIS 1941, zoo6 WL 1115427 (Ohio Ct.App. 
Apr. 27, 2006) (where contract awarded payment to broker who assisted in arranging financing 
but did not actually secure the financing, defendant could not persuade the court to adopt an 
interpretation that denied broker compensation unless he secured the financing himself since 
language did not require that). 
37 This is the case where courts adopt an objective theory to discourage parties from us-
ing language that does not conform to the ordinary objective meaning. The party who most 
easily could have clarified its intention and failed to do so must suffer the loss. 
38 See e.g., ]ODY S. KRAus & RoBERT E. ScoTT, CoNTRACT LAW AND THEORY 883-884 (2002) 
(discussing least cost avoider). 
39 See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (L.R. Exch. 1864), for an example in 
which the court had no basis for supposing that one parry or the other was more blameworthy. 
Consequently, there was no basis for concluding that the court could improve parties' incen-
tives for clarification in comparable future situations by choosing one meaning. Jd. See also 
William Young, Equivocation in the Maki11g of Agreemmts, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 619 ( 1964). 
40 As Richard Posner explained in his article on the law and economics of contract in-
terpretation, "[s]o contracts regulate the future, and interpretive problems are bound to arise 
simply because the future is unpredictable," see Posner, supra note 3, at 1582. This lack of 
foresight may cause parties to "deliberately use vague or 'indeterminate' formulations." Goetz 
& Scott, supra note 17, at 269 (emphasis in original). Interpretation may also arise because par-
ties choose to paper over differences with ambiguous language. See MARVIN A. CH!RELSTEIN, 
CoNCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS 94 (2006); Posner, supra note 3, at 
1582. 
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the express terms or a hands-off approach. To curb opportunism the court 
may have to assume a role in intervening through active interpretation. 
Courts may do this while explicitly adhering to a plain meaning or parol 
evidence rule.41 
Due to this uncertainty about the future, parties draft economically 
incomplete contracts.42 These contracts are economically incomplete in 
that they fail to take into account all possible states of the world43 or fail to 
Interpretation problems may also arise because the parties attach different meanings to 
the same words, a problem addressed by the law of misunderstanding in contract law. This is 
likely to happen when there are terms that have more than one plain meaning. Kraus & Scott, 
supra note 38, at 650. When variable meanings exist and each parry attaches a different subjec-
tive meaning to a term and neither parry is responsible for or aware of the ambiguity prior to 
contracting with the other party, a court may find no contract exists. "[W]hen neither parry is 
blamable, or both parties are equally blamable, for an incurable uncertainty in their contract, it 
makes economic sense to allow the contract to be rescinded." See Posner, supra note 3, at 1591. 
This article will focus on how uncertainty about the future complicates the drafting tasks of 
parties and the interpretation issues for courts in ways that differ from the case where parties 
serendipitously happen to contract on a plain meaning unaware that the other party attaches a 
totally different meaning to the word(s). It will deal with instances when the differing mean-
ings attached by the parties are not so divergent that no contract exists. See Chirelstein, supra 
at 96 (discussing instances where "the element of misunderstanding or ambiguity is simply 
overwhelming and there is nothing sufficiently common or mutual to make a contract out 
of'). !d. That problem will not be addressed in this article, though a misunderstanding about 
a certain term forces the court to interpret the meaning using economic principles that trade 
off the costs and benefits of various judicial approaches to "disambiguating the meaning." 
Posner, supra note 3, at 1581. 
41 For a similar argument that courts emphasize plain meaning while resorting to other 
implicit considerations, see Eyal Zamir, The bzve11ed Hierarchy of Contract !tzterpretation and 
Supplementation, 97 CoLUM. L. REV. 1710,1730 (1997). 
42 The recognition that parties will often fail to achieve completely contingent contracts 
that provide for an optimal outcome in any future state of the world raises the important 
question of what role courts could or should play in such contracts. This topic of incomplete 
contracts has been addressed by four law and economic scholars in a recent symposium called 
Incomplete Contracts: l11dicial Responses, Transactional Planning and Litigation Strategies. The 
Symposium appears in s6 CASE w. REs. L. REV. 135-201 (2005). The three articles in the 
Symposium are by Richard Craswell, Avery Katz, Robert E. Scott and George Triantis with an 
introduction by Professor Juliet P. Kostritsky. For a path breaking treatment of incomplete-
ness see Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REv. EcoN. STUD. 
IIS (1999). 
Scholars working in the law and economics tradition have suggested that courts should 
use a hypothetical bargain approach to incompleteness, filling in terms that are optimal (ef-
ficient) and that the parties themselves would have achieved were it not for the transaction 
costs. New insights from economics complicate the analysis of incompleteness in contracts. 
Uncertainty and the cost of and limited access to information are key problems affecting par-
ties both ex ante when contracts are being drafted and ex post when they are being enforced. 
This article will explore these effects in the interpretation realm. 
43 When the contract fails to take account of potentially different states of the world that 
may materialize in the future, it is said to be "incomplete because it has a one-state parti-
tion in a two-state world .... " Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of 
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control future behavior under the contract.44 It is often uncertainty about 
the future that causes a term to be ambiguous even though it appeared 
to be unambiguous at drafting. A word may have a meaning but it may 
be unclear whether the parties meant that word to govern no matter what 
future state of the world materialized and the parties never mentally 
adverted to the issue ex ante.45 The terms themselves might call for a certain 
performance (that seems to raise no interpretive issues) and grant one party 
discretion on how a party should behave in rendering that performance (or 
at least there are no express limits on the discretion). Interpretation must 
resolve whether there are any implicit limits on a party's discretion in how 
the contract performance is rendered. The job of the court then has to 
go beyond simply making the original contractual choice transparent or of 
carefully deciphering the parties' intentions. 
If transaction costs were zero and the parties had perfect foresight, 
as well as perfect ability to craft language that accounted for the future, 
they might be able (at least theoretically) to craft complete contracts that 
required no interpretation by courts nor any law-supplied terms.46 In a 
real world of high transaction costs and bounded rationality,47 however, 
Incomplete Agreemmts a11d l11dicia/ Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 272 ( 1 992). 
Contracts also remain incomplete because problems of uncertainty make it difficult 
w control for behavioral choices in the furure. In such cases "more uncertain environments 
... should leave more discretion w the agent. It is interesting w note that, as uncertainty 
increases, rhe optimal contract may become simpler, in the sense of a lower total complexity 
cost." See Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing 
Contracts, 92 AMER. EcoN. REv. 798, 799 (2002}. 
44 Of course, deciding if a contract is incomplete and thus requires interpretation or is 
"complete enough rhar no reasonable interpretation or implied terms questions arise" is still 
a concern. George Cohen, Implied Terms and Interpretatiotz in Contract Law, itl 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND EcoNOMICS So (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest, eds., 2000). 
45 See illjra notes IJ6-IJ8 and accompanying text (discussing whether a contract that 
specified a red parr would mean red in all instances even when red part were nor available 
but green (equivalent but for the color} parts were available). The issue is whether the term 
should have an undifferentiated meaning or whether red might be interpreted w include 
green if the furure materialized in ways that could not be anticipated when rhe contract was 
drafted. 
46 A complete contract would normally vitiate the need for judicial interpretation. As 
Professor George Cohen explains: "Economic analyses generally conclude that if a contract 
is complete, there is no beneficial role for a court other than to enforce the contract accord-
ing w its terms; that is, incompleteness is a necessaty, though nor sufficient, condition for an 
active court role in interpretation .... " Cohen, s11pra note 44, ar 8o. See also Luca Anderlini, 
Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, Jlfodeli11g Collrts i11 Contract Theory, Address ar Case 
Western Reserve University (Mar. 28, 2007) (discussing passive role of courts in "frictionless 
world"). 
47 For a discussion of bounded rationality as a result of the cognitive limits, see 
WILLIAMSON, sllpra note 13, at 45· These problems are exacerbated because contracts rake 
place in the unknowable furure. 
2007- 2008] PLAIN MEANING VS. BROAD INTERPRETATION 53 
interpretation and gap filling by courts are unavoidable since parties are not 
willing to incur the infinite costs needed to make a contract complete.48 
This article concentrates on the interpretation issue.It views it as a subset 
of the issue of when courts should intervene in private arrangements when 
contracts are presumed to be incomplete in a number of different ways.49 
In some ways judicial interpretation-since it starts with express terms-
would seem to present fewer instances of direct intervention by courts than 
is the case when a court supplies missing terms. However, ruling out an 
active judicial role in interpretation is only possible when courts interpret 
contracts that use unambiguous language50 and are economically complete. 
Once the possibility of ambiguity due to uncertainty and incompleteness is 
recognized, this article argues that a broader role for courts in interpreting 
contracts51 can be justified on the same grounds that justify the implication 
of law-supplied terms.SZ This article rejects the current dichotomous 
framework, and proposes a framework as well as a list of heuristics useful 
for deciding when an active approach to interpretation is likely to produce 
welfare improvement. This framework will use a cost/benefit analysis that 
takes into account the cost of the behavioral problem of opportunism and 
the ease or difficulty a court would have in deciding if opportunism has 
occurred. In addition, the proposed framework and heuristics will take into 
account (1) whether or not a judicial decision for one party would foster 
counter-opportunism by the other, (2) the transaction cost of controlling 
the problem through express contracting, (3) whether any trade practices 
exist that would provide objective, non-manipulable evidence of a 
48 As judge Posner explains the cost: "perfect foresight is infinitely costly, so that, as the 
economic literature on contract interpretation emphasizes, the costs of foreseeing and provid-
ing for every possible contingency that may affect the costs of performance to either party 
over the life of the contract are prohibitive." Posner, supra note 3, at I582. 
49 The separation of implied terms and interpretive issues is a somewhat artificial dis-
tinction since "[i]n some sense, all contract disputes involve questions of interpretation and 
implied terms." Cohen, supra note 44, at 79· Doctrines dealing with implied terms focus on 
whether a term is being added or a term overridden by a court. Interpretation issues focus on 
ascertaining meaning in already existing terms. This article will focus on interpretation issues, 
recognizing that economic analysis might be relevant to both and might provide a common 
justificative framework for both adding terms and broadly interpreting terms. 
50 See it!. at 8I (arguing that unambiguous "terms represent a confluence of the parties' 
intentions and the court's ability to interpret those intentions correctly"). 
5 I See Posner, supra note 3, at I 587. Judge Posner recognizes that the process of gap fill-
ing and of "interpreting" ("disambiguating") contracts present different problems for courts 
but they are "both, however, interpretive in the sense that they are efforts to determine how 
the parties would have resolved the issue that ha[d] arisen had they foreseen it when they ne-
gotiated their contract." !d. at IS86. Interpretation might require a court to decide the mean-
ing of a best efforts clause while a court engaged in gap filling might have to decide whether 
a best efforts clause should be inserted into a contract. !d. 
52 The typical justification for a law-supplied term or rule posits that where transaction 
costs prevent parties from reaching an optimal or first-best outcome, the law should seek to 
supply a term that the parties would have agreed on absent transaction costs. 
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practice designed to control opportunism and improve welfare, (4) the 
informational burden on a court, (5) whether a broad interpretation would 
control discretion in a contract that would otherwise be uncontrolled under 
a plain meaning or non-contextualized interpretation, (6) whether literal 
interpretation would leave one party vulnerable after having invested sunk 
costs in a way that could be avoided by using trade usage or other evidence 
to interpret meaning, (7) whether one party would get an unexpected and 
unbargained-for windfall that could be avoided by a broad interpretation, 
(8) whether a secret code or idiosyncratic meaning exists that is at odds with 
plain meaning but that can easily and at low cost be ascertained by using 
extrinsic evidence to interpret the meaning, (9) whether the admission of 
the evidence is likely to embroil the court in a difficult to decide issue of 
whether the evidence shows a practice that is one of grace or of a legal 
obligation, and 10) the robusmess of non-legal reputational sanctions. 
II. THE DICHOTOMOUS APPROACH 
Scholars have fiercely debated the proper approach for courts to take in 
interpreting contracts. 53 Traditionalists advocate restricting the use of 
extrinsic evidence, while the contextualists argue for a broad scope for 
extrinsic evidence in contract interpretation. One particularly controversial 
matter concerns the degree to which courts should resort to extrinsic 
evidence such as business customs and norms in interpreting contracts. 54 
The Willistonian classical approach55 gave primacy to the written 
agreement and restricted the evidence that could be used to supplement 
or interpret the contract. 56 The court's role was necessarily confined to 
implementing the parties' intentions as they were reflected in the actual 
language of the contract. Sometimes this approach is referred to as the four 
corners approach-a "rule [that] bars the parties to a written contract that 
53 For an early trenchant article on the problem of interpretation of contracts, see Goetz 
& Scott, supra note 17 (documenting the negative effect on innovation from a strategy of in-
corporation). For more recent examples of scholarship addressing the economics of interpreta-
tion see Posner, supra note 3 and Shave!!, supra note 5· 
54 See iufra note 55· See also Juliet P. Kostritsky, Judicial fucorporatio11 of Trade Usages: A 
Fu11ctio11al Solutio11 to the Opportunism Problem, 39 CoNN. L. REv. 45 I (2006); David V. Snyder, 
La11guage a11d Formalities i11 Commercial Contracts: A Deje11se of Custom a11d Conduct, 54 SMU L. 
REV. 6!7 (2001). 
55 "Willistonian formalism rests on two basic claims: ( 1) that contract terms can be in-
terpreted according to their plain meanings, and (2) that written terms have priority over 
unwritten expressions of agreement." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 569-570 n. 53· The 
approach reflected a disinclination of courts to "'make a contract for the parties."' Goetz & 
Scott, supra note 17, at 273-74. 
56 This restricted approach to extrinsic evidence was apparent in the common law doc-
trine of the parol evidence rule. 
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is 'clear on its face' ... from presenting evidence bearing on interpretation, 
which is to say 'extrinsic' evidence .... "57 
Karl Llewelyn and the legal realists rejected this narrow approach and 
substituted a more contextualized approach to interpretation in Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. Under that approach courts could consider 
evidence outside the four corners of the contract in order to better ascertain 
the parties' true contractual intentions.58 The UtJijorm Commercial Code 
permits the parties to bring in evidence of trade usage, course of dealing and 
course of performance to interpret and supplement the literal language of 
the contract. 59 The U11ijorm Commercial Code also adopted the presumption 
that trade meaning would prevail unless the parties specifically negated 
the trade meaning.60 
The new formalists have attacked this contextualized approach to 
contract interpretation and suggested a return to greater formalism, 
embracing plain meaning as the best interpretive approach.61 They have 
also argued against admitting extrinsic evidence of trade meaning unless 
the parties have agreed to have it govern their contract under a linguistic 
default pegged to ordinary meaning.62 
This article argues that the choice of an interpretive approach cannot be 
made in the abstract without a detailed assessment of which methodology 
is likely to curb opportunistic behavior and achieve the parties' goals in 
a cost-effective way. A suggested framework for contract interpretation 
57 Posner, supra note 3, at 1596. 
58 Llewellyn's approach to interpretation was reflected in the drafting of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). It was founded on the notion that the best way to insure 
that the Jaws reflected commercial reality was to admit evidence of merchant practices. This 
U.C.C. approach admits several categories of context evidence including: course of perfor-
mance, course of dealing and trade usage. See U.C.C. §§ 1-303, 1-205 (2004). 
59 See U.C.C. § 2-202 ( 1998). The Code provides a hierarchy of preference given to these 
commercial practices. See U.C.C. § 1-303(e) (2004). Where it is possible to construe the prac-
tice and the express language as consistent, it should be done but where it is impossible, 
the express language prevails. See id. Then in descending order, the most particular practice 
(course of performance in the disputed transaction) prevails over the more general course of 
dealing in prior transactions and course of dealing prevails over the more general usage of 
trade. See id. For a criticism of this hierarchy, see Zamir, supra note 41, at 1714. 
6o U.C.C. § 2-202 erne. 2 (1998). 
61 See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21. This justification for the narrow interpre-
tive approach is grounded in party preference, since this approach is "what interpretive style. 
·. typical parties want courts to use ... . "!d. at 569. Schwartz and Scott have also rejected a 
broader role for courts in matters involving stare-supplied standardized defaults. !d. at 594. 
They argue that such defaults will be "useless" and "inefficient" and they point to evidence 
that parries routinely reject such defaults to bolster their conclusion. !d. See also David 
Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI . L. REV. 842, 842 (1999) (exploring the 
"phase of'anti-antiformalism' that seeks to discredit and displace Llewellyn's claim to found 
commercial law in immanent commercial practice"). 
62 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 584-85 (suggesting this default as a way to mini-
mize moral hazard). 
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follows that is based on understanding the normative justification for 
intervention in private contracts. 
In considering whether extrinsic evidence should be admitted to 
interpret a contract, a court should carefully consider whether the contract 
is incomplete and if so, why and how the contract remains incomplete63 and 
should also consider the type of evidence sought to be admitted and evaluate 
whether the evidence would promote or hinder opportunistic behavior. 
The court should inquire into whether there is evidence of a trade practice 
that is specifically designed to control opportunism.64 Different types of 
extrinsic evidence, including course of dealing, course of performance, 
and trade usage, should be evaluated to determine what goal the practice 
or usage was designed to achieve, whether judicial incorporation of the 
practice would advance that goal, and at what cost. 65 Courts should also 
examine the reasons for the omission of the trade practice from the express 
contract, including barriers that may have prevented the parties' inclusion 
of a particularized custom or a generalized clause opting into all business 
customs and practices into their express agreements. 
In some cases, the best way to minimize opportunistic behavior by a 
party when the express contract does not explicitly limit discretion nor 
expressly incorporate trade usages or practices is to liberally admit contextual 
evidence of trade usages.66 By confining questions of interpretation to 
those express terms that parties have formed an intention on, and denying 
context evidence without examining the normative choices involved in 
admitting or excluding the evidence, the new formalists have avoided 
inquiry into when courts "are a superior governance mechanism" 67 when 
parries have formulated no intention in the contract. This article hopes to 
illuminate that issue. 
63 Schwartz, supra nore 43, ar 272. This article hopes to shed light on some ofrhe reasons 
that parries' contracts are incomplete and to connect those reasons to an analysis of when 
legal intervention in the form of broadly interpreting contracts using contextual evidence 
might produce welfare improvements. See Robert E. Scorr, The Case for Formalism i11 Relatio11al 
Co11tract, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 847, 853 (2ooo) (discussing complication in rhe court's role in in-
terpreting contracts due to "questions of whether rhe parries failed to complete the contract 
deliberately or inadvertently and whether the incompleteness is a product of high transaction 
costs, asymmetric information, or other endogenous factors"). !d. This article suggests that 
high transaction costs and asymmetric information both contribute to rhe failure to control 
opportunistic behavior. Rather than avoiding provision to control opportunism because the 
parries fear that courts will nor be able to judge rhe matter, as would be rhe case if rhe court 
were judging rhe stare of demand or cost, matters more readily determined by the parties, the 
parries face insuperable costs in contracting for control of hazard. 
64 If rhe trade practice is of such a type, courts should readily admit the practice as a 
low-cost means of achieving joint gain by controlling moral hazard. 
65 The costs would include evaluating litigation and enforcement costs. See Posner, stt-
pra note 3, ar 1583. 
66 See infra notes 152, 154 for examples. 
67 Cohen, supra note 44, ar 82. 
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This article suggests that a model for judicial intervention that can solve 
interpretive challenges that courts face, while maximizing gains for parties, 
should strive to minimize the sum of four costs: the costs of contracting, 
the costs of opportunism including the cost of unremedied opportunism 
in a literalistic approach, the costs of enforcement and the error costs from 
intervention (the cost of a court making an erroneous interpretation). The 
costs of opportunism have been neglected and the error costs have been 
exaggerated in interpretive questions because error costs have been lumped 
together in the aggregate to refer to all types of interpretive efforts by courts. 
If the various types of interpretive efforts by courts can be segregated, and 
cases where the risk of opportunism are great and burden on the court of 
identifying opportunism, using the heuristics suggested here or the parties' 
intentions is low, the risk of error may be low, thereby altering the cost/ 
benefit analyses of active, contextual judicial interpretation. 
The costs of contracting include the costs of specification (drafting). 
The fact that sometimes parties may want to use ordinary meaning and 
sometimes they may want to use trade meaning may be a subset of 
specification costs and further complicate them. 68 Part of the new formalists' 
aim is to provide parties with incentives to engage in more careful drafting 
as a way of reducing judicial errors. The view is that if parties devote more 
resources to drafting, the burden on the court of interpreting the contract 
is reduced and error costs are minimized. However, this article argues that 
certain problems may remain resistant to contractualized solutions. In 
such cases likelihood of the error will be greater with a textualist than a 
contextualist approach. 
The costs of opportunism are several. First, if opportunism goes 
unremedied, it may deter parties from contracting in the first place or to 
reduce the incentives to make investments in the contract.69 The_risk of 
opportunism may cause parties to undertake expensive precautionary 
measures such as intensive screening of contracting partners, and extracting 
bonds or hostages, such as expensive collateral. It may even cause firms 
to vertically integrate to avoid the opportunistic behavior of a contractual 
partner.70 All of these precautionary measures that reduce the gains from 
trade constitute a type of transaction cosr71 and so the parties desire to 
68 The costs of contracting also include the cost of the parties' needing to know what the 
law is. There may be value in letting the parties use the language they want in the way they 
Want without having to figure out what the default and opt-out options are. 
69 See Katz, supra note 9, at 529. 
70 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 13, at 85-86 (exploring economizing aspects of vertical 
integration). 
71 See )EAN-]ACQUES LAFFONT AND DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MoDEL 3 (2002) (discussing "additional costs that must be incurred be-
cause of the strategic behavior of privately informed economic agents ... as one category of 
the transaction cost emphasized by Williamson ( 1975))." 
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control this hazard in ways that will minimize the efforts and costs of such 
controF2 in order to maximize gains from trade.73 
Error costs arise when courts make erroneous interpretations of words 
having a variable meaning. There are many causes of such errors, including 
the failure of courts to recognize when parties have trumped implied 
terms with privately crafted alternatives.74 The new formalist view is that 
error costs inevitably rise with contextualist approaches to interpretation 
and so should be avoided and only a truncated base of evidence should 
be admitted. However, once the possibility of incompleteness in contracts 
is accounted for, then errors of another sort will arise when .contracts are 
interpreted literally, suggesting that at least in some cases, fewer errors 
will arise with a contextualized approach. If the contract is silent and 
incomplete in controlling discretion and yet if both parties would want 
to curb opportunism to maximize gains from trade, then interpreting 
contracts literally will lead to an error of another sort. It will cause courts to 
refuse to add any terms controlling discretion, a result that promotes, rather 
than curbs, opportunism, leading to increases in deadweight losses for the 
parties. 75 
72 The efforts ro control opportunism are subject to a "budget constraint." E-mail from 
Professor R. ]. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Universiry Law School to 
Professor Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School 
(July 19, 1996) (on file with author). 
It is this anticipation of opportunism that will reduce the amount that the parry "would 
have been willing to pay up front without rhe prospect of such later cost." E-mail from 
Professor R. J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Universiry Law School to 
Professor Juliet P. Kosrritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Universiry Law School 
(Apr. 28, 2004) (on file wirh author). 
73 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 60 ( 1996). 
74 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 17, at 263. 
75 For a case where a court avoided this trap and interpreted the contract in light of evi-
dence that a narrow interpretation would result in an unbargained-for advantage, see Local Am. 
Bank of Tulsa v. United Stares, 52 Fed Cl. 184 (2002). In the Tulsa case, the court had to inter-
pret a contract to determine what the covenant of good faith required. See id. at 189. Although 
there was a change of circumstance, the withdrawal of the tax benefit that had formed the 
basis of the deal, since the government had itself lobbied for its withdrawal and at same time 
secured the bank's consent to a deal on the proffering of such tax benefits, there could be no 
argument that since the circumstance was a new one that the parries had never contemplated, 
the contract might have to be interpreted or reinterpreted to rake account of rhe contingency. 
See id. at 191--92. In that case the circumstance, the tax benefits of the deal, formed the very 
basis of the deal. See id. If the bank had learned that the government would work to withdraw 
the tax benefits that induced the bank to go along with the purchase of some insolvent banks, 
consent would nor have been forthcoming. The court's interpretation precluded opportunistic 
behavior and thereby helped to facilitate contracting and reduce deadweight losses. See also 
Winston v. Mezzanine lnvs., 648 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Cr. N.Y. County 1996) (court refused to 
limit its inquiry to contract document in irs interpretation of "prioriry return" and effect was 
to curb the discretion of the general partners whose own preferred interpretation would have 
"undercut" the purpose of tailoring rhe payment to the manager's performance). !d. at 503. 
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III. THE CASE FOR LITERAL INTERPRETATION 
AND A "MINIMUM EVIDENTIARY BASE"76 
Before examining how a flexible interpretive methodology geared toward 
preventing opportunism in incomplete contracts77 would operate and might 
lead to welfare improvement, the new formalists' arguments in favor of 
literal interpretation and a truncated base of extrinsic evidence should be 
addressed. The article will highlight the assumptions and the limitations of 
the approach, especially when applied to incomplete contracts. It concludes 
that the arguments for a unified approach of literalism fall short because 
they ignore the need for courts to make normative choices in interpreting 
contracts that are incomplete. 
The case for a literal interpretation-made by the new formalists-
built on a narrow base of extrinsic evidence posits an unrealistic model that 
assumes complete contracting.78 In an important recent article, Professors 
Schwartz and Scott, two exemplars of the new formalism, have embraced 
plain meaning and argued that the default rule for contract interpretation 
should be a narrow Willistonian one that admits only a "minimum 
evidentiary base," 79 unless parties specifically opt for a broader approach to 
interpretation.80 
Schwartz and Scott argue that a Willistonian exclusion of extrinsic 
evidence would reduce contracting costs, minimize moral hazard problems, 
reduce interpretive errors by courts and facilitate more efficient, complex 
comracts.81 The pair assert that parties should be able to choose which 
76 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2 I, at 573· This restricted base is known as B . See 
id. ~"[T]he mitigation of hazards can be the source of mutual gain"). WILLLIAMSON,supr~'~ote 
73, at 6o. 
77 Incompleteness might take the form of failing to address specifically what the implied 
covenant of good faith is. See Local Am. Bank of Tulsa, 52 Fed. C1. at 189--<)0. (interpreting 
content of good faith covenant to preclude withdrawal of tax benefit that formed basis of the 
deal). 
78 Both models of judicial interpretation, as discussed by Schwartz and Scott, "suppose 
that the contract is complete in the sense that the writing expresses the parties' solution to the 
contracting problem at issue." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 573· 
79 See id. (suggesting a texrualist approach to contract interpretation built on a minimum 
evidentiary base is the approach that parties would prefer). 
8o There are certain exceptions including cases in which the fact of bias-free judicial 
decisionmaking is not satisfactory. In certain contexts, parties are favored or disfavored by a 
court's interpretation and may gain or lose by a court's error. In other contexts, such as the per· 
feet tender rule, "the seller wants the court to find the correct answer with certainty" because 
it will gain no extra advantage when its quality passes muster and will lose everything if its 
quality is below the standard no matter the amount of deviance. /d. at 578. This means that 
"when a court is only right on average, the seller's expected payoff under the contract is less 
than its expectation interest." /d. 
81 See id. at 584-88. Scott and Schwartz argue that this inefficiency (of using simpler 
contracts that are inefficient) in contracting -will be caused by a contextualized approach to 
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interpretive default will govern their contract. 82 Because parties, on average, 
prefer a restricted evidentiary base, courts should apply this preference as 
the default rule in contract interpretation. 53 
Because the Scott/Schwartz model, as do many textualist models, 
assumes that judicial interpretation should be confined to cases where parties 
have formed a complete contract84 the court's interpretive role is limited 
to ascertaining what the parties intended by their contractual language-
the "correct answer". 85 The model thus adopts a factual or "semantic" 
approach to the problem of contract interpretation. 56 The very fact that the 
new textualists seek an interpretive style that the "parties [would] want 
courts to use when attempting to find the correct answer" 87 demonstrates 
the limits of the formalistic search for the preferred interpretive style. 
When contracts are incomplete, there is often no such thing as a "correct 
answer" since the parties never formed an intention that courts could later 
identify as the "correct answer." Thus, the search for an interpretive style 
that courts should use and that parties would prefer courts use to identify 
the correct answer will not identify what interpretive style parties would 
prefer courts to use when the contract is incomplete and there is no correct 
answer.88 Artificial limits on the court's interpretive role-limited to finding 
interpretation. See id. at 587-88. Under a contextualized approach the error rate is likely to 
be greater than it would be under a plain meaning regime. This error risk will cause parties 
to "use simpler, but possibly less efficient, contracts." !d. at 587-88. This article suggests that 
in some cases a simpler contract will be more efficient and the risk of error under a contex-
tualized approach to interpretation will vary depending on the type of contextual evidence 
at issue. Thus, the article would disagree with the Schwartz and Scott unified and reflexive 
conclusion that "contextualist regimes increase the likelihood and cost of disputes .... " !d. 
82 See id. at 569 (discussing party sovereignty). 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at 573· Both models of judicial interpretation that Schwartz and Scott discuss 
"suppose that the contract is complete in the sense that the writing expresses the parties' 
solution to the contracting problem at issue." !d. They make this assumption since "[c]ourts 
can only interpret what is said, so our analysis assumed that the parties' writing was complete 
for the subjects at issue." /d. at 594· But deciding what the writing said and whether it was 
complete or not cannot be resolved without a normative theory of interpretation. The real 
issue is when state intervention in economically incomplete contracts is likely to be welfare 
maximizing or not given the costs and benefits of the particular intervention. 
85 /d. at 568-69. 
86 Such contracts may be economically incomplete because they address an issue di-
rectly, but fail to provide terms that control the exercise of discretion arising in connection 
with that term. 
87 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2 1, at 569. 
88 The failure of the text to contain a correct answer can also occur when the parties 
implicitly assumed that the contract language would operate in one context and a different 
context materializes. Professor Bowers explains: "[i]f the context that actually occurred dif-
fered substantially from that implicit in the formulation of the contract clause, it may be that 
the parties never had any agreement in the first place. If the context is really unprovided-for, 
the contract is truly incomplete. There is no 'correct answer' .... " James W. Bowers,Mmphyj· 
2007-2008] PLAIN MEANING VS. BROAD INTERPRETATION 61 
the correct answer-only make sense if one accepts without reservation 
the notion that the contract at issue is complete and that parties actually 
form an intention on all matters that are covered by the express language 
or that might come up. 
Another key assumption by Schwartz and Scott, connected to the 
assumption of a complete contract, is that a court's role should be limited 
to "find[ing] the correct answer ... to a contracting problem that the parties 
intmded to enact." 89 Their view is that both party autonomy and efficiency 
require the adoption of this approach to contract interpretation.90 If the 
court is not restricted to determining "just what the person had agreed to 
do," 91 then the court would not be facilitating autonomy or maximizing the 
surplus for the parties. Only when courts implement the parties' actual 
solution is there evidence that the deal is value maximizing.92 
Schwartz and Scott advocate for party autonomy by restricting the court's 
interpretive role to implementing the parties' actual solutions. 93 They 
suggest that a "sufficient" justification for court intervention in contract 
disputes lies in the "court ... making the person do what he agreed to do." 94 
Schwartz and Scott assume that the language enacted will allow the court 
to discover an actual intention of the parties that should be given effect. 
However, the issue for modern contract theorists and legal decision 
makers is whether and when legal interpretation can be justified when 
the parties' agreement is silent or unclear, raising the question of whether 
there are other bases that would provide an alternative "sufficient" 
justification for judicial resolution of a contract dispute. In fact, as Steven 
Shavell recognizes, even if (as is often the case) the parties adopt a broadly 
inclusive express term, it is not clear that they would really want such a 
term "enforced as written in the particular contingency that occurred." 95 
LafJJ• and the Elementary Theory of Contract Interpretation: A Response to Schwartz and Scott, 57 
RuTGERS L. REv. sB?, 603 (2005). 
89 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 568-69 (emphasis added). "This goal [of efficien-
cy] is unattainable if courts fail to enforce the parties' solution but impose some other solution. 
Thus, the court must ascertain the solution that the parties actually adopted." !d. at 569. 
90 !d. at 569. 
91 !d. Their hypothesis seems to be that parties will contract to maximize the surplus 
that a deal creates-this is evidenced by the fact that they made the deal, period. This hy-
pothesis is only acceptable if there are no informational asymmetries, or systemic defects in 
parties' ability to gauge risks or to perceive the future. When there are such shortcomings, it 
may no longer be clear that the literal contract interpretation maximizes surplus. 
92 !d. 
93 Seeid. 
94 !d. 
95 Shavell, supra note 5, at 292. An example that Shave!! uses is one in which a "general 
term is interpreted as written but does nor always result in the ideal act for the parties: This 
occurs when a general term (E. a.) is interpreted as written, the parties do not want a. to be 
performed in a least some con'ci~gency e. in E., bur the expected gain from an alte/native 
' ,, 
contract (writing an explicit term fore,, including (};in another general term, leaving a gap) is 
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When parties have formed no particular intention on whether and how far 
to enforce a performance obligation, searching for an actual intention will 
be unavailing. 
A formalist theory of interpretation by its own design simply does 
not have anything useful to say when contracts are incomplete. Because 
Schwartz and Scott assume the parties have reached a complete contract 
and because "(e]conomic analyses generally conclude that if a contract 
is complete, there is no beneficial role for a court other than to enforce 
the contract according to its terms ... ," it is not clear why there are any 
complicated interpretive questions that would arise that would require 
judicial resolution. 96 
Because parties often fail to formulate a particular intention as to 
whether a written term should apply in a particular instance or whether 
the performance obligation stipulated in the express terms should be 
interpreted to contain implicit limits on how the performance obligation 
is rendered, it is impossible to separate questions of contract interpretation 
from normative theories that allow a court to intervene in incomplete 
contracts or to fill gaps. Because contracts remain incomplete, a theory 
of interpretation that insists on confining the judicial role to the express 
terms and an actual party's intentions, the theory can have nothing to say 
on how incomplete contracts should be resolved. Schwartz and Scott have 
determined that they would bifurcate interpretation questions (semantic) 
from "determining the legal significance that should attach to the semantic 
content." 97 Once one admits that intentions may be unclear on the scope of 
the clause or that no specific intention may have existed, then it becomes 
incumbent on courts to justify their interpretation by resorting to some 
model of what the parties would consider an ideal (optimal) interpretive 
solution, making bifurcation of interpretation and normative theories of 
gap filling unrealistic. 
Often contracting problems are not susceptible to a contractual solution 
and an agreement may be reached by the parties without solving all of 
the parties' problems. One problem that is particularly difficult for the 
parties to control by express language is the problem of party behavior. 
Since it is "costly to describe ... the parties' behavior,"98 in many contracts, 
parties will not be able to anticipate all of the various ways that each can 
take advantage of the other.99 Contracts allow for discretion when it is 
lower." !d. at 299. Thus, in some cases it would be optimal for the court to not interpret the 
contract as it is written. 
96 Cohen, supra note 44, at 8o. If all contracts are complete and assumed to be written in 
ordinary language, then the court's job would seem to be one of enforcement. 
97 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 568 n.so. 
98 Battigalli & Maggi, supra note 43, at 799 (emphasis removed). 
99 !d. at 8r 1. 
2007-2008] PLAIN MEANING VS. BROAD INTERPRETATION 63 
impossible to carefully control all aspects of an agent's behavior. 100 Because 
of uncertainty, it is prohibitively expensive to draft a complete contract that 
accounts for all the ways an agent can act opportunistically. 
Confining the interpretation problem to simply finding out the parties' 
intentions based on the express language of the contract, as textualists 
would do, neglects the fact that contract interpretation should involve 
more because parties actually enact the problem of incompleteness in 
their contracts. Many of the parties' potential problems are not addressed 
in the contract because of various barriers to inclusion. 101 In addition to 
drafting costs, which hinder detailed contracting to control behavior of 
an agent and opportunism, the parties may neglect to include a general 
clause term controlling opportunism because the generalized commitment 
not to act opportunistically applies to so many contexts that parties may 
assume that they are implied terms. 102 They may also be so vague as to be 
unenforceable103 and may not be believed. 
For the above reasons it is incorrect to assess a theory of interpretation 
along the two dimensions that Scott and Schwartz suggest: "(1) the 
likelihood that the style of contracting will generate the correct answer ... 
and (2) the costs that the style imposes on courts and parties." 104 Assessing a 
theory of interpretation according to its ability to reach the correct result is 
defined in terms of ascertaining what the language adopted by the parties 
was intended to mean is not a broad enough basis upon which to assess the 
success of an interpretive theory. 
Instead, to be successful, a theory should be able to guide the courts 
when the language adopted is ambiguous, when the parties have not 
formed any clear intention on the meaning or scope of the words used and 
when there are actual gaps or when the contract is obligationally complete 
but economically incomplete. 105 The contracts are inefficient because they 
fail to provide for outcomes that are tailored to specific contingencies that 
develop. In an ideal costless world, the contract would permit a seller an 
excuse if the seller's costs exceeded the value that the buyer placed on 
the good.106 Moreover, because it will often be impossible ·to identify the 
1 oo Cohen, supra note 44, at 89 (discussing the principal-agent contracts as "[c]lassic 
examples of high-transaction costs contracts"). This is in large part because of the uncertainty 
as to future choices that the agent might have to make on behalf of the principal. 
101 The barriers to inclusion are: the complexity of the environment, uncertainty about 
future events and uncertainty about future behavior of the parties. 
102 Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining With Uncertainty, Moral Hazard and Sunk Costs, A 
Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 621,673 (1993). 
103 WILLIAMSON, supra note 13, at 63. 
104 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 573· 
105 See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis,JncompleteContract.r and the Theory of Contract 
Design, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 187, I9D-I9I (2005) (explaining how a contract can be obliga-
tionally complete but "incomplete in the economic sense"). 
106 !d. 
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parties' intentions, intention cannot form a linchpin of a broad interpretive 
theory. Schwartz and Scott's narrow assumptions limit their ability to create 
a broader theory that would apply to cases involving incomplete contracts. 
In such contexts one cannot isolate the interpretation or language question 
from the context of the problem that contractual language is crafted to 
solve as well as the transaction costs associated with crafting solutions. 
The formalists' attempt to isolate the interpretation issue from the factual 
context under which contracts are made, including the barriers that 
preclude complete contracts, distorts the cost/benefit analysis of literalism 
and contextual interpretation. 
The exclusion from consideration of incomplete or ambiguous contracts 
from their theory of interpretation allows Schwartz and Scott to build their 
argument for a party preference for a literalistic contractual default. This 
article will examine their technical arguments for a minimum evidentiary 
base as the preferred interpretive default against the background of 
incomplete contracting. 
They posit that if one restricts the evidentiary base to the minimum 
one, the courts will be able to find the "correct answer" 107 with "positive 
probability." 108 They concede that if a court considers and admits extrinsic 
evidence beyond the minimum evidentiary base, it is more likely to reach 
the correct answer in a particular case. 109 Thus, more contextual evidence 
can reduce the variance defined as the court's "deviat[ion] from the correct 
answer." 110 However, since parties are on average risk neutral, and "[a] risk-
neutral party cares about the mean of the interpretation distribution but not 
the variance," 111 they are only concerned with whether on average courts 
will find the correct interpretation and not with variance. 112 Sometimes 
courts will make errors, but if "[j]udicial errors ... cancel in expectation," llJ 
107 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 212, at 575· 
roB !d. 
109 !d. 
I 10 fd. 
l I I fd. at 576. 
I I 2 Professor Bowers makes a different but powerful argument against the notion that 
parties do not care about variance but only about whether on average courts get the correct 
result. Thus, courts could reach extreme results that varied from the correct interpretation, 
but as long as they reached extreme results in the opposite direction, then parties would be 
indifferent to these wide variations. However, Professor Bowers points out that the greater 
variance from the correct interpretation may actually "create greater moral hazard than nar-
rower, more limited variances do." Bowers, supra note 88, at 6oi. The important point to note 
about this argument is that parties would like to reduce the degree of variance in order to 
discourage opportunism and "[i]f, therefore, considering contextual evidence in any contract 
dispute tends to narrow the variances of the error, firms might in fact prefer Corbin style con-
textualist contract interpretation rules .... " !d. 
r 13 Schwartz and Scott, supra note 21, at 575· This is because "the court is unbiased ... 
[and] is as likely to make an interpretation that is more favorable to the buyer (less favorable 
to the seller) than the correct answer as the court is likely to make a less favorable interpreta-
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then on average courts will get the correct interpretation and that is all 
that risk neutral parties care about. 114 Moreover, because admitting more 
evidence and increasing the evidentiary base will be costly, and will not 
ensure an error-free result, the increased accuracy will not be worthwhile 
to the risk neutral party who cares not about accuracy in a particular case 
but about average accuracy across a broad range of cases. 115 
This article argues that before accepting the implications that risk 
neutrality has for the preferred interpretive approach, the differing 
meanings of risk neutrality should be explored. 116 
In one of its two distinct meanings, risk neutral parties comprise those 
who "in arriving at the presmt value of a future stream of possible values, 
do not discount the ex a11te expected value (that is, the weighted arithmetic 
mean of future values) in light of their uncertainty, (risk) .... " 117 The 
assumption is that most actors, including firms and residual claimants, are 
not risk neutral in this sense of evaluating the value of projects that they 
might invest in or reach a contract on. Even if they have insurance to cover 
the risks associated with more uncertain streams of future income, that 
insurance is costly118 and firms are not indifferent to the risks. 
There is a second sense in which firms are thought to be risk neutral and 
that is "with reference to selecti11gjrom among risky projects after valuation 
of a future income stream of risky values has been correctly established in 
light of risk." 119 At this second stage, if managers can costlessly shift from 
one risky project to another, then as amongst those differing and risky 
projects, firms are risk neutral. This is the sense in which economists mean 
to refer to firms being risk neutral. After having done the initial valuation 
that includes risk as a component, firms might then decide to invest all of 
their assets in risky ventures. 
Ex a11te in evaluating future projects, however, firms do pay attention 
to the risk associated with the future income stream. For that reason, we 
can assume that risk does play a role in terms of what projects and what 
tion." 
114 Schwartz and Scott assume that firms are risk neutral. !d. at 576. 
115 !d. "This is because the variance term measures risk while risk-neutral parties are 
indifferent to risk." !d. 
1 16 I am indebted to Professor Ronald ]. Coffey for pointing out this distinction. 
117 E-mail from Ronald]. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law to Juliet P. Kosrritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law (Dec. 15, 2006, I 1:42 EST) (on file with author) (emphasis in original); see also 
Katz, supra note 9, at 526 (discussing risk of varying "information sets"). PAUL M1LGROM & 
]OHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, 0RGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 465 (1992) (discussing relation-
ship between risk and "computing present values"). 
1 18 Professor Coffey points out that: "There is a cost to insurance, however, which re-
duces present value the same as a discount rate would without insurance." Coffey, supra note 
I 17. 
119 !d. 
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contractual transactions firms will invest in. Once that point is recognized, 
then in choosing the correct interpretive approach, courts should adopt 
an approach that will reduce overall risk for parties, since firms are not 
indifferent to risk in the initial evaluation of whether to invest or contract 
when there is risk associated with it. 
So if firms are not indifferent to risk at the time they are making the 
initial evaluation of future income streams, risk and the need for insurance 
to guard against risk, as opposed to the second level determination of 
substituting one risky project for another, then firms would value various 
strategies, including contractual interpretation, that reduced risk, including 
the risk of opportunism. Courts should only be free to ignore risk when 
parties themselves would be indifferent to risk, as they would be in 
choosing amongst risky projects. 
The no_rion that parties may be affected by whether courts adopt 
optimal interpretations-a rejection of the Scott/Schwartz view that 
parties care only about getting a correct answer on average-is reflected in 
Professor James Bower's argument that deviation by courts from an optimal 
interpretation may significantly impact parties' decisions to contract with 
other parties. As Bowers explains, if a correct interpretation will maximize 
joint gains for parties, an erroneous interpretation by courts could result in 
a low enough gain that parties would simply forego contracting altogether 
and proceed separately. 120 It is in this sense that firms may not be indifferent 
to erroneous interpretations. 
The deviation from a correct interpretation, to the extent that it 
increases the risk of opportunism and shields one party from the adverse 
consequences of its opportunism, has a parallel in financial economics. In 
that context, "the agent's 'propensity to diverge' [is viewed] as creating 
the prospect of a negative future return stream to the firm." 121 For that 
reason firms strive to control that "propensity to diverge" [© R.J. Coffey] 
and search for cost-effective methods of controlling that risk. 122 
This article argues, therefore, that contracting parties share a similar 
preference for controlling the risk of opportunism as a means of increasing 
joint gain. 123 The dichotomous approach of the new textualists to 
interpretation that gives total preference to the words and rejects a broad 
extrinsic base and trade meaning, unless specifically opted into, may 
not achieve parties' functional goal of reducing the risk of behavioral 
opportunism and so should not be preferred. 
Part of the textualists' embrace of plain meaning can be explained by 
their isolation of the interpretation issue from the bargaining context under 
120 Bowers, supra note 88, at 607. 
121 E-mail from Professor Ronald ]. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case School of Law to 
Juliet Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case School of Law (Dec. 19, 2006) (on file with author). 
122 Doing so will act as a source of gain for the firm. 
l 23 WILLIAMSON, supra note 73, at 60. 
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which a contract is made, including the limitations on the parties' ability to 
achieve their functional goal of maximizing gains from trade through the 
reduction of the risk of opportunism. That isolation distorts the comparative 
cost/benefit analysis of literalism and contextual interpretation. Yet one 
cannot isolate the interpretation or language question from the context 
of the problem that contractual language is crafted to solve as well as the 
transaction costs associated with both courts and parties crafting solutions 
to those problems. 
In deciding which approach to admissibility of extrinsic evidence on 
interpretation questions is preferable, account should be taken of one the 
major problems contracting parties' face-uncertainty about the future 
and especially about the potential choices that a party will have to make 
in carrying out its performance obligations under the contract. Ideally, the 
court's interpretation should control party discretion to deter opportunism,124 
at least if such "interpretation" does not create other greater risks of court 
error or facilitate counter-opportunism by the other party. Discretion 
is most likely to occur when it is costly to describe all of the varieties of 
opportunism and behavior that are likely to occur in a contract. 125 
The problem of discretion and opportunism would often remain 
unaddressed were contracts literally interpreted; literalism would fail 
to control the forms of opportunistic behavior parties may engage in 
when carrying out their express performance obligations. 126 When the 
124 This discretion may arise when one party is expressly given the power to make 
choices in a contract (as in a requirements contract where the buyer may elect to tell the seller 
what its requirements are) or it may arise because the contract is incomplete due to uncer-
tainty. If there is uncertainty, one party may be hired and the contract may remain simple 
and obligationally incomplete, forcing the party hired to make choices in a variety of cases. 
A babysitter must decide when to take the baby outside, etc. See Battigalli & Maggi, supra 
note 43, at So1 n.5. A contract may also be obligationally complete in general terms (a red 
widget in all cases; see i11jra note 136) but economically incomplete. It does not take account 
of some future contingency that might affect whether the specified choice is appropriate in all 
contingencies. In those cases, there is arguably an element of discretion that requires judicial 
interpretation. If the contract is obligationally complete in general terms but it does not ad-
dress what would happen in a contingency, the question is whether the court should deviate 
from the literal meaning. 
In other cases the contract may not be obligationally complete. There may be no control-
ling term at all telling a babysitter what to do in various situations. See Battigalli & Maggi, 
Sllpra note 43, at Sol n.5. Or, there may be no controlling authority on how to handle one's 
discretion in doing a job as a headhunter collecting resumes. See i11jra notes 149-50 and ac-
companying text. In these cases as well, judicial interpretation may be required in order to 
maximize value. 
1 25 See Battigalli & Maggi, supra note 43, at So 1. 
126 Of course the opportunism may be controlled by extra contractual devices such as 
reputational sanctions, but in some cases the gains of opportunistic behavior might outweigh 
the cost from the reputational sanction, making a judicial sanction necessary. Karen Eggleston, 
Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Desig11 a11d l11terpretatio11 of Co11tracts: Why Complexity 
A1atters, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 116 (2000). 
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inevitable uncertainty of parties' behavioral choices and the need to 
control opportunistic behavior are accounted for, the insistence on literal 
interpretation of contracts and a restriction to the "minimum evidentiary 
base" are likely to be counterproductive. The contractual language may 
be precise yet fail to address or control for behavior that might arise in 
connection with how a party carries out its duties under the words, leaving 
an element of discretion in the contract. If the interpreter considers the 
possible range of choices in behavior that one party might make while 
complying with the language, then a literal, narrow semantic interpretation 
will not be value-maximizing because it will fail to control opportunistic 
behavior. When gaps exist or the words encompassing behavioral choices 
themselves require "legal" interpretation, courts may need to resort to an 
interpretive approach that makes normative choices. 127 
If the parties' intentions are unclear on the scope of the clause or no 
specific intention may have existed or discretion exists, then it becomes 
incumbent on courts to justify their interpretation by resorting to some 
model of what the parties would consider an ideal (optimal) interpretive 
solution, making bifurcation of interpretation and gap filling models 
unrealistic. 
When contracts are incomplete (as they inevitably are), the refusal to 
admit extrinsic evidence leads not only to occasional errors with a correct 
result on average (the result predicted by Schwartz and Scott), but also 
to judicial decisions that do not maximize surplus. 128 When the contract 
is silent, or when it affords broad discretion to a party-a large subset of 
contracts cases-an interpretive default rule that relies on the express 
language of the contract simply will not achieve the parties' goals. 129 In 
such cases the court will be unable to ascertain the parties' intentions 
from the express language, yet the contract will still require interpretation. 
Maximization of joint value for the parties is the principle that should guide 
this interpretive process. 
The court's interpretive methodology, including how much extrinsic 
evidence is admitted, should depend on which methodology will curb 
opportunism in a cost-effective manner. Textualism may provide a 
solution if the terms that parties agreed to completely address a problem. 
In such cases if the court takes a term and broadly interprets it beyond 
127 If you admit ambiguities in either plain meaning or the relevant norm, then "even 
the proper application of either strategy will serve at best to limit the range of interpretive 
disagreement." KRAUS & WALT, supra note 25, at 194--95. 
128 This point is consistent with Professor Bower's insight that interpretive errors may 
result in the loss of a surplus as parties decide to forego contracting because acting alone they 
may achieve gains that exceed those from an improperly interpreted contract. Bowers, supra 
note 88, at 607. 
129 This search for a fictional intent that may not exist versus formulating an approach 
that will be responsive to parties' needs and goals has a parallel in the debate between the 
originalists and the consequentialists in constitutional interpretation. 
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the scope intended by the parties, then there will be negative economic 
consequences. "For example, if a court imposes a stronger performance 
obligation on an obligor than the parries intended, then future obligors 
will extract a higher price .... " 130 In these cases courts are reallocating the 
original obligations, a result that will nor maximize value since the contract 
was priced on the original obligations, not expanded ones. 
However, textualism may engender negative consequences, at least if 
the contract being "interpreted" is incomplete in the sense of not controlling 
behavior. An example, 131 to be developed later, is as follows: A headhunter 
is hired for a fee. The company agrees to pay for any of the headhunter's 
referrals that the company actually hires. A literal interpretation might 
suggest that the company would have to pay if it hired one of the referrals 
even if the headhunter did nothing but amass the resumes of all U.S. 
citizens. Such an interpretation, while literally compliant, would neglect 
the fact that there is a hidden element of discretion (not spelled out) in 
what the headhunter must do to earn its fee. 
The problem with an entirely textual approach to contract interpretation 
is that in many cases there is express language but the parties have 
formulated no intention on the meaning or none that can be discerned from 
the text itself. In addition, what seems like an express term (the payment 
of a fee to a headhunter for resumes presented) may actually shield the 
fact that one party (the headhunter) is going to exercise discretion under 
the contract that needs to be controlled; a semantic interpretation would 
simply accept the literal term. 
If one applies a textualist approach that does not allow for implied terms 
or a broad approach to judicial interpretation, then courts will be unable to 
solve some critical problems for the parties, which failure will engender 
130 Cohen, supra nore 44, ar 84. 
131 This example is from Professor Aaron Edlin. See infra nore 149. 
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deadweight losses. 132 This deadweight loss is something that the parries 
would want to avoid ex ante. 133 
Thus, in such cases, where the court narrowly confines itself to the 
minimum evidentiary base but the contract is silent on a problem to be 
solved, the expected judicial interpretation would involve a 100% error rate. 
Even parties who were risk neutral in the sense posited by Schwartz and 
Scott would want the court to admit the extrinsic evidence to avoid such 
a large error rate. Not adding it would mean that the court has absolutely 
no chance of solving the parties' problems and in such cases literalism 
will not be a preferred or value maximizing strategy. 134 If one accepts that 
firms are not indifferent to risk, at least in evaluating projects initially and 
deciding which contracts to put resources into as distinct from the decision 
to substitute one risky project for another when selecting among risky 
projects, 135 then the 100% error rate or risk would not be value maximizing 
for the parties. 
Schwartz and Scott make other (instrumental} arguments in favor 
of literalism. They posit that a literalistic regime will reduce error and 
contracting costs and minimize the opportunity for moral hazard. This 
article concludes that a literalistic interpretive default's assumed advantages 
become less compelling when one distinguishes between different types of 
contextual evidence that may be admitted and develops heuristics to guide 
a court. A blanket prohibition on contextualist evidence should not govern. 
Textualist defaults also lose much of their appeal when decision makers 
pay adequate attention to the fact that contracts will often incompletely 
I32 Schwartz and Scott would argue that implying terms in the form of default rules can 
be counterproductive by increasing moral hazard. Thus, if one were to create a state default 
rule that is conditioned on asymmetric information, then the parties will often be "exploited 
for private ends." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2 I, at 6oS. If a state seeks to complete a con-
tract that is economically incomplete because it does not condition on different states of the 
world by for example making the price depend on the state of the demand, a state supplied 
rule premised on such unverifiable factors as the state of demand is likely to be inefficient. 
Courts will not be able to determine what the state of demand is and so parties, knowing that, 
would have avoided drafting a contract conditioned on that variable. A court's supply of this 
term would therefore be inefficient. See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 272. 
This article suggests that while certain state supplied default rules may be inefficient for 
the reason that parries themselves would have avoided conditioning on certain variables, the 
state can play a productive and efficient role in the interpretation of contracts even when it 
goes beyond the evidentiary base and judicially interprets incomplete contracts. The condi-
tions for efficient interpretation are explored infra in the Methodology section of the Article. 
I33 See supra note 22. 
I34 This article assumes that the other private devices for controlling opportunism and 
discretion such as repurational controls, tit for tat strategies, contractual devices, bonding, 
monitoring and screening are costly and might outweigh judicial intervention costs to police 
opportunism. 
I35 See mpro note I IS. 
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control a party's behavior if one adheres to a literalistic interpretation of 
the language. 
IV EXAMPLEs: BoTH REAL AND IMAGINED 
In the following hypotheticals and examples, the parties have neglected 
to provide for a future contingency, such as an unanticipated shortage, or 
have neglected to control discretion under a contract. In each case the 
court must confront whether it should intervene by incorporation of a trade 
usage or some other extrinsic evidence for interpretation purposes. In 
these cases contextual ism would produce joint welfare gains, assuming that 
court intervention is cheaper than self-enforcement and that conditions of 
uncertainty, bounded rationality, and sunk costs exist. 
If a contract, for example, specifies red, "red" may not mean "red" 
at all. 136 It is possible to envision a trade usage where a party agrees to 
purchase red component parts, but routinely accepts green parts if, for 
some reason, red parts are unavailable. In this situation, "red" may mean 
"red unless there is a shortage of this part, in which case it means green." 137 
"Red" is just a crude tool that the parties use as an efficient placeholder 
when it is costly to express a complex idea. Parties are forced to resort 
to simple language like this because they face limitless specification costs 
to draft a fully contingent contract that accounts for every possible future 
state of the world, including whether a party would ever be able to satisfy 
its obligations with a non-red widget. The contract is therefore incomplete 
in failing to condition performance on a particular future contingency. 
A manufacturer of television sets could encounter such an ambiguity 
when it contracts for the purchase of red plastic widgets that hold circuit 
boards in place. The price of plastic dye could go up considerably, making 
un-dyed green plastic widgets cheaper. The part is an internal component 
that the consumer never sees, and it does not affect the functionality of the 
product. Producers of televisions prefer to use red widgets for consistency's 
sake (it may be an industry standard to which all producers adhere). 
However, there may be a custom that green widgets are acceptable when 
the production of red widgets is interrupted by market forces (perhaps 
there is a competing industry that is cyclical and has a large demand for 
red widgets, perhaps the dyes are difficult to procure, or come from a 
136 I am grateful to Michael Dory for this example. If one contracts with the Target 
corporation "red" likely means a particular shade of red that is much more specific than the 
general term "red." 
137 This case might provide an example of a case in which the contract is obligationally 
complete but not fully detailed because a contract that says to use red "no matter what is not 
fully detailed but is obligationally complete." See Shavell, supra notes. In cases such as these, 
Professor Shave]] suggests that there may be a reason to offer an interpretation that differs 
from the literal interpretation. !d. at 299 (suggesting cases where interpreting the terms as 
written "does not always result in the ideal act for the parties .... " ). 
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region suffering perennial geopolitical instability, etc.). If every television 
manufacturer accepts green widgets when red ones are unavailable, or are 
too expensive, then "red" in a contract for "red widgets" would have an 
inherently uncertain meaning. Under these cases, it might make sense to 
admit the trade usage. 138 
In this example, the producer of the red plastic widgets would have a 
performance obligation to supply red plastic widgets. Yet, the contract is 
incomplete: it fails to specify what to do when the red plastic widgets become 
unavailable. It therefore raises the question of whether the producer has 
the discretion to manufacture green plastic widgets and whether doing so 
would satisfy its performance obligation to the manufacturer of television 
sets to supply red widgets. These are questions of interpretation that cannot 
be resolved under a literal interpretation or an approach that searches for 
the correct solution that the parties have formulated their intentions on. 
To decide whether extrinsic evidence of a trade practice should be 
admitted as part of a broad approach to interpretation, a court should 
consider why the parties omitted the practice, whether interpretation would 
help to control or worsen opportunism, whether the practice was specifically 
designed to curb opportunistic behavior and whether a court is able to judge 
whether opportunism has occurred ex post. One mechanism that the parties 
develop as a means of controlling such opportunism and where the contract 
remains silent or incomplete is the trade usage. The heuristic from this 
case is that courts can and will apply a trade usage to interpret a contract 
when the court does not need to engage in complex determinations about 
whether the usage applies in all cases or only in a narrower group of cases 
such as when the other party is not itself acting opportunistically. When 
a party insists on plain meaning to displace a universal usage, it is likely 
to be an opportunistic action that the court should not promote. Because 
the usage is designed to control opportunism, a deviation itself constitutes 
good evidence of party opportunism. Courts readily enforce such trade 
usages when they can easily ascertain whether one party has acted 
opportunistically in violating the trade usage. 139 Restricting the evidence to 
the "minimum evidentiary base"-the express terms-would hamper the 
control of opportunism and increase moral hazard. 
138 The case might be a more difficult one for a court to decide if there were no trade 
usage and the court had to determine whether the change in circumstances would call for a 
different interpretation and a variation from a red widget. The risk of error might be greater 
than if a court could rely on a trade usage. 
139 When the trade usage itself seems designed to prevent a parry from opportunistically 
taking advantage of another parry whose sunk costs would otherwise be lost or not recouped 
were the trade usage not applied, opportunism does not seem difficult to judge. In some 
cases, however, particularly where the events are non-verifiable, opportunism may be harder 
to judge. See Cohen, supra note 44, at 91 (discussing difficulties of judging opportunistic 
behavior). 
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In the plastic widget example one can surmise that the parties omitted 
the practice of substitution for any one of a number of reasons. First, they 
may have failed to contemplate the non-availability of red widgets and 
so made no express provision-an unforeseen contingency. Second, the 
parties may have omitted to include an express clause opting into all trade 
practices because there is a subset of trade practices that they might not 
want legally enforced;140 they might be reluctant to agree to a general opt-
in clause. Yet, presumably the parties would want a court to incorporate 
the trade practice permitting a substitution of green for red widgets. 
Otherwise, a party could opportunistically seek to have a term interpreted 
to mean red with no substitutions in circumstances where doing so might 
cause the other party to be in breach and allow the advantaged party to 
seek a cheaper source of widgets, whether red or green. 
If a contract contains certain provisions obligating a party to do a certain 
act in return for a return payment, one parry can exercise discretion in 
a way that will adversely affect the other parry (who may have invested 
sunk costs) unless that discretion is controlled.141 If the court can police 
opportunism ex post, in a cost-effective way, then it should assume an active 
role. 
In many cases courts assume an active role in incorporating trade 
practices that are specifically designed to curb opportunism. In this set of 
cases involving the exercise of discretion (described below) the default 
rule of a "minimum evidentiary base" should not govern interpretation 
issues. Doing so would permit deadweight losses of opportunistic behavior, 
a result that would not maximize gains from trade. 
The cases described below all involve contracts in which one party 
ultimately sought to exercise discretion in a way that was not explicitly 
controlled by contract so all of the contracts were incomplete. In each 
case the court admitted extrinsic evidence of a trade practice. Doing so 
140 These include cases in which a party wants to retain the discretion whether to adhere 
to a practice, generally one which waives a strict term, because the decision to adhere or not 
will depend on information that is readily available to parties bur not w courts. See Kostritsky, 
supra note 54, at 459· 
141 In some ways the effort of the law to control discretion appears in many junctures 
in contract law. In bilateral contracts where parties promised to perform reciprocal duties and 
had not conditioned a duty to perform on the other party being ready, willing and able to 
perform, the courts invented the doctrine of constructive conditions of exchange in order to 
prevent one party from opportunistically insisting on performance while withholding his own 
performance and forcing the other party to extend him credit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CoNTRACTS § 234 cmt. a; see also Edwin Pam!rson, Constroctive Conditions i11 Contracts, 42 
CoLUM. L. REV. 903 (1942). Before the doctrine of constructive conditions of exchange, absent 
an agreement of dependency, parties would remain unprotected against the risk that one party 
would act opportunistically to demand performance from the other party without performing. 
That risk would require one party to turn over assets or money to another party who has done 
nothing to demonstrate a willingness to perform. In devising the fiction of constructive condi-
tions of exchange, courts mitigated that risk and thereby increased joint value for the parties. 
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helped to curb opportunistic behavior that would otherwise have occurred. 
If applied to such cases, the default rule proposed by Schwartz and Scott 
of limited extrinsic evidence would result in uncontrolled opportunistic 
behavior. 
In one case, Cord Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. Aubrey Manufacturer Inc., 142 for 
example, a party ordered a manufacturer to produce a plastic mold and 
agreed to buy plastics produced by the mold. The manufacturer incurred 
considerable expense in manufacturing the mold that could only be 
recouped by the agreement to buy plastics made from the mold. 143 
There was no express contract provision controlling, by a general or 
specific clause, discretion on the potential opportunistic behavior by the 
buyer of the manufactured plastics. This case is typical of many contracts in 
which parties have difficulty anticipating all of the various contexts in which 
opportunism might present itself and so detailed provisions controlling 
for such behavior are expensive to craft. The contract also lacked any 
generalized clause promising to act in the joint interests of the parties. 
These general clauses are rarely enacted in part because parties may think 
that they are too generalized to be enforceable 144 and would be disbelieved 
or discounted because of the presence of opportunism as a facet of the 
human condition. Parties might also fear including such clauses because it 
would require courts to police behavior without sufficient guidance. 
A question arose in Cord as to whether the buyer could simply remove 
the mold and manufacture its own plastics without paying the manufacturer 
anything for the mold. Since the contract was silent on that issue, the court 
could have insisted on literal enforcement and said that since no contract 
provision obligated the buyer to pay a fee for the mold, that the court could 
not impose one. However, such literal interpretation would not have been 
value maximizing since it would have left the manufacturer subject to 
uncontrolled opportunistic behavior. The court successfully regulated that 
behavior by directing the trial court to admit extrinsic evidence of a trade 
usage that obligated buyers in such cases to pay a mold removal fee. 
The admission of the broader evidence in Cord and similar cases 
would increase gains from trade since it served both parties' interests by 
controlling the general problem of moral hazard (by discouraging a party 
from appropriating the mold) and thereby opportunistically preventing the 
party with the sunk engineering costs from recovering the costs through 
sales over time. Cases involving discretion present a large subset of cases in 
which restricting a court to the minimum evidentiary base is not appropriate 
142 Gord Indus. Plastics, Inc. v. Aubrey Manuf. Inc., 431 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
143 !d. See also Kostritsky, supra note 54, at 502 (discussing Cord and similar cases in-
volving irretrievable sunk costs and trade usages designed to police the exploitation of such 
investments). 
144 WILLIAMSON, supra note IJ, at 63. 
2007-2008] PLAIN MEANING VS. BROAD INTERPRETATION 75 
and in which admission of the trade usage to interpret the contract will 
control a contractual risk. 145 
In another case, a contract similarly lacked express provisions to control 
discretion and behavior. The contract required the defendant/lessee to 
return the leased planes in "their original condition" to the lessor. 146 The 
court had to consider and interpret the meaning of "their original." In 
many contexts a literal reading would suggest that the meaning was one 
of returning the planes in the same condition that they had been turned 
over to the defendant. But on the facts, the court found it was error to 
refuse to admit evidence of context that would put a greater burden on a 
lessee in this situation. Rather than being obligated merely to return the 
planes in the same condition, the lessee might be required to overhaul the 
planes. 147 Without that broader interpretation based on extrinsic evidence, 
the plaintiff's massive investment in the sunk cost of the airplane could 
have been greatly reduced. The court held that it was error for the trial 
court to exclude such evidence on the assumption that the term in "their 
original" condition was self-defining. 
This airline example illustrates another possible heuristic that courts 
should use in deciding how broadly or narrowly to interpret a contract. When 
there are express words in a contract yet there is an aspect of discretion 
in how one performs an obligation that is the subject of those words, the 
court should and will be more likely to adopt a broad interpretation if doing 
so will control discretion that would otherwise be uncontrolled under a 
formalist approach. 
The counterargument to automatic inclusion of broader context in a 
case like the airplane maintenance case is that if the party wants to impose 
on the lessee the obligation of maintaining the airplane in a particular 
way, that he should include a clause in the contract. Absent inclusion, the 
145 For example, in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 24 Pa. D. 
& C.2d 720 (Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County 1961 ), the court had to determine 
whether the bank that took out an insurance policy on a car had to notify the dealer of the 
lapse ofrhe policy. Because the contract was silent, the bank that financed the sale, in effect, 
had discretion on whether and when to notify the dealer that the insurance policy had been 
cancelled due w a default. The court found that under both a course of dealing and trade us-
age the bank was required ro notify the dealer of the policy default. Thus, even though there 
was no express requirement of norice, the court "interpreted" the contract ro include a notice 
provision. The court-supplied term would presumably benefit both parries. By regulating 
the behavior of the bank to act in a way that ignored the interest of the dealer in having early 
notice "in order ro protect [itself]," the court regulated the ability of the bank to prefer its own 
interests. !d. at 726. The intervention could be achieved at a relatively low cost since the 
usage itself would provide evidence of a private solution of parries ro the problem of uncon-
trolled discretion. Textua!ism would have provided no solution since the contract was silent 
on the matter. Self-enforcement through reputational sanctions by dealers who learned of the 
practice might provide an alternative mechanism of control. 
146 Haeberle v. Tex. lnt'l Airlines, 738 F.2d 1434, 1437 (Sth Cir. 1984). 
147 !d. 
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counterparty (the lessee) might argue that it assumed that because there 
was no clause requiring maintenance that would preserve the plane's ability 
to fly, that no such obligation was being imposed and that the contract was 
priced accordingly. To permit invocation of the trade usage would arguably 
allow the lessor to gain an unbargained-for advantage. 
The difficulty with the counterargument is that the prevalence and 
regularity of the trade usage will lead lessors to assume that the trade 
meaning would prevail. They will reasonably believe that the meaning of 
the contract "ordinary wear and tear" will be read in the context of trade 
usages. The parties in the trade won't know that you have to specifically 
signal that meaning in order for it to govern in the contract. They will 
assume that trade meaning is ordinary meaning. 148 
One. difficulty with having a majoritarian ordinary plain meaning 
govern and excluding extrinsic evidence in cases such as those discussed 
above is that either there is no term at all to govern (as in the plastic mold 
manufacture) or the plain meaning will not control the behavior at issue 
(as in the airplane case). Under Schwartz and Scott's approach unless 
the parties have generally or specifically opted into the particular trade or 
private party meaning, ordinary plain majority meaning would govern and 
context evidence of how differences in the meaning of "original condition" 
might differ in a standard context from an airplane context would be 
disallowed. An ordinary meaning approach would not actually solve the 
need to control discretion in how the planes are serviced and such behavior 
that, if not controlled, will foster opportunism, increase deadweight loss, 
and deter contracting ex a11te. 
Literal enforcement of an express term without context evidence could 
also facilitate opportunism in other scenarios. Imagine a hypothetical case, 
posed by Aaron Edlin, 149 in which a headhunter is employed by a company 
that agrees to "pay for any of the headhunter's referrals that the company 
hires." 150 The language at issue describes some ministerial act, such as 
paying a fee to a headhunter who supplies resumes and in that sense it 
is obligationally complete. The language says nothing, however, about 
possible ways in which the headhunter could purport to perform an action 
that would literally entitle it to a payment and in that sense is economically 
incomplete. 
However, the headhunter could, at its discretion, engage in activities 
that should be considered a breach of the performance obligation despite 
literally adhering to the terms of the parties' contract. The headhunter, 
148 I am gra[eful to Professor Avery Ka[z of Columbia University Law School for poin[-
ing [his om. 
149 Commems made by Professor Aaron Edlin, Professor of Law, University of California, 
Berkeley, a[ [he University of California a[ [he Columbia Conference on Comrac[s, April7-8, 
:wo6. 
ISO ld. 
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instead of culling the resumes and presenting a small number of qualified 
candidates to the company for the position, could send the company the 
resumes of all U.S. citizens and the company could eventually hire one of 
those U.S. citizens. 
The question would then arise as to whether the company is obligated 
to pay the agreed on fee to the headhunter. 151 A literal interpretation of the 
language would suggest that payment of the fee is due. The interpretation 
issue arises because although the contract is obligationally complete, it is 
incomplete in an economic sense. The contract fails to impose any limits 
on discretion by the headhunter though presumably it would be efficient 
(though costly) to control such discretion. 
A similar issue in which an element of discretion is hidden in a seemingly 
clear statement of a performance obligation was presented in the famous 
Dixo11 letter of credit case.152 The court had to decide whether to admit 
evidence to interpret a term that obligated the seller to furnish the bank 
with a "full set" of bills of lading. Because of a delay, the seller could only 
present one original bill of lading but was willing to supply an indemnity 
covering the bank for any losses it might sustain in honoring the bill of 
lading. 153 Trade practice universally permitted such indemnities but the 
bank refused to honor the indemnity. 154 The court had to decide whether to 
admit the trade usage in interpreting a seemingly fixed term of the contract 
or whether to insist on literal enforcement of a full set to mean a full set. 
A hidden aspect of the case and many similar cases is that a party in 
carrying out its duties may act opportunistically by insisting on literal 
compliance with the express terms of the contract. That danger can be 
controlled by the courts if they admit contextual evidence of a trade usage 
that controls such behavior or discretion by subjecting the contract to a 
reasonableness interpretation that is different from literal interpretation. 
The bank had argued that it retained the absolute discretion to reject the 
proffered indemnity. 
In the Dixo11 case the court admitted evidence of the trade usage 
obligating banks to accept indemnities and rejected the plain meaning 
interpretation. That trade usage was a private strategy for controlling 
the potential that a bank would act opportunistically. A bank could seize 
upon technical non-compliance to shield itself from a risk that it had 
undertaken-namely that it might be difficult to collect reimbursement 
from the buyer's bank if changed circumstances, such as war, adversely 
affected the buyer's bank overseas. 155 
151 !d. 
152 Dixon, Irmaos CIA, Ltda., v. Chase Nat'l Bank of N.Y., 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944). 
153 !d. 
154 Jd. 
155 See John Honnold, Comment, Letters of Credit, C11stom, Missing Documents, 011d the 
Dixon Case, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 504 (1953). 
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In these cases (Dixon and headhunter case) and in others, literal 
enforcement of the clause for payment would seem to obligate the company 
to pay the headhunter a fee and for the bank to insist on a full set of bills 
of lading. Yet, by admitting evidence of a trade usage or by interpreting 
the clause using a reasonableness test, the court could control the behavior 
and discretion that a party might have in performing under the contract. 
Thus, in cases where the contract is incomplete in controlling behavior, 
invocation of context evidence can control rather than foster opportunism, 
especially when the existence of a benchmark trade practice is universally 
adhered to and there is no reason to think that the usage would not apply in 
some subcategory of cases (as might be the case where the usage might be a 
matter of grace rather than right because the applicability might depend on 
information to which the parties, but not a court, would have access) reduces 
the· judicial error costs with interpreting contracts using such evidence 
since the violation of a practice designed to deter opportunism would be 
deemed opportunistic. Even in cases such as the headhunter, when there 
is no trade practice to serve as a benchmark indicator of what constitutes 
opportunistic behavior, a court should be able to judge ex post that allowing 
a headhunter to earn payment without doing any of the work that would be 
expected of a specialist/agent hired to do a task constitutes opportunism. 
Even if the implicit expectations of an agent are not completely spelled 
out because of the cost of doing so, and the company is reluctant to put in 
benchmarks that measure quantitative steps that the agent should perform 
since they do not capture the issue of effort and quality that the company 
was seeking, 156 a court should be able to judge ex post that assembling 
resumes without any vetting of those resumes would fall short of the effort 
expected of an agent for hire. 
v. THE CASE FOR A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF ORDINARY MEANING 
A separate issue that arises in any contract interpretation is the issue of what 
language was intended to govern. Schwartz and Scott also disagree with 
the Uniform Commercial Code presumption in favor of the admissibility of 
extrinsic evidence of trade practices to determine what language governs, 
the ordinary meaning or the private trade meaning. They posit that the 
"interpretive issue" about what language governs the contract should be 
resolved by a presumption that contracts are written in ordinary talk unless 
the parties specifically opt into trade language or party talk. 157 This presumption 
156 John W. Pran & Richard]. Zeckhauser, Priilcipals aild Agwts:An Overview, in PRINCIPALS 
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 9 (John W. Pran and Richard ]. Zeckhauser eds., 
1985>-
157 Schwanz & Scan:, sapra note 21, at 573, 584. That interpretive issue would be 
resolved using no outside evidence. Instead, the courr would look only to the parries' express 
declaration in deciding on the language issue. Silence would indicate a preference for majority 
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would constitute the preferred "linguistic default" that would govern the 
interpretive issue of what language governs a contract, 158 making extrinsic 
evidence superfluous. 
The interpretive issue of what language governs is closely connected 
with the issue of how broadly the court should expand the base of extrinsic 
evidence. If courts were to follow the rextualists' approach, then unless the 
parries opted into trade meaning, ordinary majority talk meaning would 
govern and courts would not admit contextual evidence on the language 
meant to govern the contract. 
To address these interpretive challenges and to decide if a presumption 
of ordinary meaning is optimal, we need a methodology that is attentive 
to the reasons why the interpretive problem arose, i.e., why parries might 
fail to expressly reject ordinary majority talk in their contracts, and opt into 
trade meaning as the interpretive default. 
This article argues that because the interpretive presumption against 
trade language and in favor of ordinary meaning will not always maximize 
gains from trade for the parties (the accepted goal of private contracting), 
and is likely to facilitate opportunism in many cases, it should nor be 
adopted. This article's basic objection is that the rextualists assume that 
language selection is a matter that parties can deal with ex ante as a stand 
alone issue, apart from the functional goals that the parries hope to achieve. 
Bur whether a court is interpreting what language governs the contract 
or deciding the appropriate width of the extrinsic base of evidence, the 
methodology the court uses should remain the same and should not be 
artificially separated from a normative theory that will allow the court to 
reach a value maximizing result for the parries. Nor can one isolate the 
interpretive question oflanguage selection from the context of the problem 
that the contractual language was crafted to solve or the transactions costs 
associated with crafting solutions to the problems the parries face. 
The problem with the rextualists' isolation of the language questionfrom 
the normative issues in contract interpretation is that unless parries have 
opted our of ordinary meaning, it will govern in cases where it will simply 
not be value maximizing. Ordinary meaning would govern outcomes such 
as the headhunter case, and would not solve the opportunism problem that 
would occur if headhunters could insist on "ordinary meaning" and avoid 
any need to undertake the onerous task of actually culling the resumes of 
applicants. 
There are several arguments put forth by the new texrualists in favor 
of an ordinary language linguistic default. First, the suggestion is that 
the burden on parties who want trade meaning to govern is low since 
parries may easily opt our of the default presumption in favor of ordinary 
talk. 
158 !d. at s84-8s. 
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meaning159 by simply subscribing to a clause that trade meaning governs. 160 
This ignores the fact that there is a spectrum of trade practices. Parties may 
wish to retain certain trade usages or practices to inform the language issue, 
while opting out of others. Thus a one size fits all rule enshrining ordinary 
meaning as the interpretive default may not serve the functional needs of 
the parties or maximize value. A more tailored method to incorporation and 
thus to interpretation utilizing a taxonomy of factors or heuristics would 
improve decisions regarding when trade meaning should be admitted for 
interpretation to produce welfare gains. 
Requiring the parties to expressly incorporate trade usages and practices 
to have them govern a contract is premised on assumptions about the 
effects that the announced rule-no trade practices if not expressly written 
into the contract-wi!! have on parties negotiating future contracts ex ante. 
The implicit assumption is that parties will thereby be induced to always 
draft express terms incorporating the trade usage and thereby save on error 
and misinterpretation costs in the future. 
The presumed effect of a default rule denying effect to trade meaning 
unless expressly incorporated is that it will cause parties to reform in the 
future. They will expressly incorporate those trade practices that they want 
to govern meaning, but that projected reaction to the announced legal 
rule may not occur in all instances. That failure suggests that there may 
be unanticipated costs from the insistence on express inclusion. In some 
instances the announced rule will cause parties to opt for express inclusion, 
particularly where a trade association exists to police the uniformity of the 
documents and to spread the start up costs of drafting. But cost barriers 
may prevent a large segment of the affected population from even knowing 
the rule and adjusting their behavior in accordance with the rule. In those 
instances insistence of a rule denying effect to trade usages not expressly 
incorporated would mean that many of the usages designed to control 
opportunistic behavior would be ignored and the consequence would be 
an increase in opportunistic behavior creating a drag on gains from trade. 
Moreover, because many parties are likely to assume that trade meaning is 
ordinary meaning, they won't know that one has to specifically signal trade 
meaning in order to have it govern the contract. Because of the assumption 
that trade meaning will govern and because parties won't even know 
enough to discern when they are using trade meaning and when they are 
using a word with only an ordinary but no trade meaning, forcing parties 
to specifically opt into trade meaning will impose translation costs. 161 The 
reliance on trade meaning is so ingrained that it will be assumed to be part 
159 The opt our of the default presumption could be handled by a general clause. 
Schwanz and Scou suggest the following: "This agreemenr is w be read in light of the cus-
toms of the widget trade." /d. 
160 !d. 
161 See Kraus & Walt, supra note 1<~7, at 199 (discussing these "translation costs"). 
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of every contract. For that reason, a party who is going to insist on a non-
trade meaning ought to have to signal that deviation so that the other party 
can price the contract accordingly (i.e. on the basis of ordinary, non-trade 
meaning). 
Another problem with the announced rule of no trade practices unless 
expressly incorporated is that the express terms of the trade practice 
once they were in the contract would themselves have to be interpreted. 
Insistence on express language may not be a panacea for avoiding judicial 
errors, so the guiding principle should be to interpret language or add terms 
in ways that parties would have subscribed to in order to maximize joint 
gams. 
The presumption in favor of ordinary language and in favor of express 
incorporation also ignores the specification costs involved when parties 
accustomed to using trade language are required to translate all of their 
assumptions and meanings into ordinary language. 162 The argument that 
since "a minority of contracts are written largely in private languages ... 
fewer parties would have to contract out of a default that supposed them 
to be written in majority talk." 163 However, it is more likely the case that 
contracts are written neither wholly in private/trade language or ordinary 
talk but in a combination of these languages. Thus, arguably a large number 
would be burdened by having to opt out of the linguistic default in order 
to have any trade meaning govern. Once one realizes that parties contract 
implicitly assuming that trade meanings will govern when they are needed 
to achieve parties' instrumental goals, then insisting on ordinary meaning 
is not likely to maximize gains from trade. 
This article posits another objection to ordinary meaning as the linguistic 
default. Connected to this objection is the notion that parties cannot agree 
on a language selection ex ante apart from the normative choices about 
which language or meaning will serve their instrumental goals_in various 
contexts. A presumption in favor of ordinary meaning would, contrary to the 
assertions of Schwartz and Scott, facilitate rather than contain opportunism 
in many instances and a court should be sensitive to that fact in determining 
what language governs. 164 The next section will attempt to demonstrate 
how and when this is likely to occur. 
162 See id. 
163 Schwartz & Scort, supra note 21 at 585. 
164 One example of how a literal adherence to a textual meaning could facilitate oppor-
tunistic behavior is Cutter Laboratories Inc. v. Twining, 34 Cal. Rptr. 317 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1963). In Cutter the court had construed a contract term of "18oo shares" to determine if those 
shares also included the shares acquired through later division of those shares through a split 
or dividend. In the original agreement Twining had placed one-half of his shares ( 18oo) of the 
company in escrow. The escrow agreement obligated the company to maintain a life insurance 
policy on his life, the proceeds of which would be paid to his wife at his death; in exchange the 
company would receive the 1800 shares of Twining's stock. Subsequently, Twining was given 
the opportunity to rescind the original agreement which had become increasingly unfavorable 
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Schwartz and Scott argue that in any contracting situation parties have a 
choice whether to draft in the majority language of ordinary meaning or 
in the private language of the trade. An alleged benefit of their proposed 
linguistic default is that it will encourage parties to draft contracts in 
majority language. 165 But encouraging parties to use majoritarian, ordinary 
meanings unless they specifically opt into trade meaning will not result 
in complete contracts and many interpretation questions will remain. 
The question should be whether encouraging parties to draft in majority 
language (ordinary English) will solve their problems in a cost-effective 
way. Schwartz and Scott believe that the use of majority language will 
reduce strategic behavior. They argue that a majoritarian default rule will 
reduce the possibility that parties will later claim a private trade meaning for 
opportunistic or strategic reasons. 166 Unless the parties have clearly opted 
into the private trade meaning ex ante they will not be able to strategically 
invoke a "fictional" private trade meaning later on and will be bound by the 
majority meaning. 167 However, this claimed advantage may not hold up in a 
broad array of cases. Since there are huge transaction costs of forcing parties 
to translate all of the meaning into a language they do not even think in, law 
should not favor one over the other. Instead, the instrumental advantages 
of joint maximization should determine which meaning governs. 
to him and favorable to the company since the stock had appreciated in value and the capital 
asset far outweighed the face amount of the life insurance policy. The court considered a 
variety of evidence to construe the term I Boo shares, including recognition that Twining had 
desired to shelter one-half of his assets from any risks that would be associated with stock 
ownership in return for a fixed asset, an insurance policy, that carried no risk of decline. 
When Twining's son tried to rescind the agreement, the court enforced the agreement 
and construed the term "I Boo shares" to include later acquired shares arising from the stock 
splits. In the case, the court reached its interpretation by using course of performance evi-
dence to show that the parties themselves interpreted the disputed term in that manner. The 
use of such extrinsic evidence effectively curbed opportunistic behavior in a way that could 
not be achieved by insisting on a textual meaning that I Boo shares meant I Boo shares. The 
text did not answer the question of what was included in the term. 
I65 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2 I, at 572. 
I66 Schwartz and Scott are assuming it would be more efficient to force a meeting of 
the minds on this issue ex ante rather than punt to the courts. This is unlike the case where 
the parties didn't specify a trade usage because they simply didn't recognize their own use 
of private talk (for example "everyone in our industry knows this is an estimate ... we didn't 
think we had to spell it out .... "), this seems like a simple failure of the parties to negotiate 
their way to a solution. In cases like that, a penalty default rule that lets one party chisel 
another could be more efficient if it saves more in litigation costs than it forces the parties to 
spend in negotiations. However, this article argues that the instrumental advantages should 
be paramount rather than the goal of forcing the parties ex ante to opt into language whose 
implications they may or may not be aware of. 
I67 I d. at 5B6. The ability of parties to invoke a fictional meaning seems inexplicable to 
Professor Bowers who asserts: "it becomes a mystery why parties might ever invent and use 
'party talk"' given the preference for ordinary meaning. Bowers, supra note BB, at 6oB. 
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Schwartz and Scan argue that because there can be multiple private 
trade meanings that parties may invoke after the fact, parties should be 
forced to signal to the court ex ante that they want those private meanings 
to govern. 168 Forcing parties to opt into private trade meanings beforehand 
lessens the chance that a party whose deal has gone bad will attempt to 
invoke a private meaning as a way of escaping its obligations. 169 
The example that Schwartz and Scott use to demonstrate the potemial 
opportunism that comes from permitting private trade meaning derives 
from two examples. The first is one based on a contract that uses the 
language "red," but a party later claims a private meaning of "green." The 
difficulty with permitting the invocation of the word green would send 
the court on the wrong quest; the court would "be attempting to find the 
correct shade of green while the parties, ex ml!e, wanted a court to find the 
correct shade of red." 170 
The red/green example seems to deviate from real life situations in 
ways that suggest the example may not be representative of the problems 
that parties face in drafting contracts or that courts face in construing them. 
In real life situations invocation of trade meaning will not be opportunistic, 
at least not across the board. The invocation of the private meaning of 
"red" to mean green seems to have no functional basis, but seems instead a 
merely arbitrary invocation of a meaning that is completely divergent from 
the literal text, leaving open the suggestion that one party may attempt to 
exploit it for opportunistic reasons. 
By contrast, in many cases, there is a trade usage that does not arbitrarily 
assign a different meaning to the literal text. Instead, the trade usage might 
suggest that a certain percentage tolerance or shortfall might be permitted 
in every delivery of a certain product and that tolerance should be used to 
interpret, broadly, the literal term. The usage may have developed because 
it may be difficult and costly to produce goods in the exact quantity 
specified. The development of a trade usage allowing a certain deviation of 
a small percentage would prevent one party from perhaps opportunistically 
claiming that a minor deviation amounted to a total breach. The usage 
would permit small deviations within a range to be tolerable and would not 
impair performance. 171 At the same time, any nonperformance not within 
the usage would be considered a breach. In these cases the party insisting 
on literal compliance is the one who seems to be acting opportunistically172 
I 68 Schwanz & Scott, supra note 21' at sS6. 
I69 /d. 
I7o /d. ar 587. 
171 See e.g. Ambassador Steel v. Ewald Steel Co., I90 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. Cr. App. 
I97I) (permirring "steel with a carbon content of IOIO w 1020"). 
I 72 In some cases the party insisting on a literal interpretation and the exclusion of ex-
trinsic evidence may be a third parry with a vested interest in getting the court to adopt a 
plain meaning interpretation that diverges from the intended meaning of both parries simply 
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and trying to avoid the burden of a trade usage that he was fully aware 
of and that both parties presumed would govern the parties' obligations. 
Contextualized interpretation of language as trade language would help to 
avert such results. 
The other example used by Schwartz and Scott to illustrate how 
permitting the invocation of private meaning will foster strategic behavior 
is one in which parties invoke trade meanings after the fact to claim that 
fixed quantities of goods are merely "estimates" .173 That claim is often 
manufactured by a party to "rescue itself from a bad deal." 174 By requiring 
a party to decide beforehand whether the quantity is an estimate and to 
invoke that trade meaning and to secure the other party's acquiescence 
to that private meaning, Schwartz and Scott argue that misunderstandings 
and opportunism can be averted. 175 
Forcing the parties to opt into a private trade meaning that a "fixed" 
quantity case really means "flexible" amount beforehand could avert 
opportunism. However, setting the suggested linguistic default rule at 
ordinary meaning is apt to allow many parties to opportunistically escape 
the burden of a trade usage that all assumed would govern. The real 
problem with the "fixed quantity" means "flexible quantity" issue is that 
there seems to be no limit on the discretion afforded the party setting 
the quantity. For that reason, it is unlikely that even if parties had had a 
difficult time setting a firm quantity in the contract, because of uncertainty, 
they would both have agreed to afford unlimited discretion to one party 
to set any quantity as a solution to the uncertainty problem. Thus, the 
problem is not with all trade usages and private meanings per se but with 
the particular type of usage that affords unlimited flexibility and invites 
opportunism. Without limits on that discretion, it would seem unlikely 
that the court's incorporation of the private meaning of "flexible quantity" 
would be value maximizing. It would be difficult for the court to conclude 
that the practice was one designed to curb opportunism and to judge after 
co secure an advantage. Such was the case in Sunbury Textile Mills, Inc. v. IRS, 585 F.zd r 190 
(3d Cir. 1978). In that case the fRS attempted to persuade the court co adopt a plain meaning 
of the word "cancel" that neither party intended in order co deny one company an investment 
tax credit that would otherwise be available under the meaning both parties clearly intended. 
The court refused co adopt the plain or dictionary meaning when it diverged from meaning 
shared by both parties. The decision is consistent with other decisions in which courts reject 
plain meaning when doing so prevents a party, in this case the fRS, from gaining a windfall. 
Doing so would deter a parry, such as the fRS, from proffering meanings simply to increase 
tax revenues to the government. 
173 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2 r, at 586. 
174 !d. This is based on the Columbia Nitrogen case. See infra note r 75· 
175 Their paradigm case is based on a series of cases in which the court had to decide 
whether a stated quantity was not in fact that quantity but a lesser amount because the use 
of a term with a stated quantity was meant co afford the buyer Aexibility. See, e.g., Columbia 
Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 45 r F.zd 3 (4th Cir. 197 r ). 
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the fact that opportunism had in fact occurred. For that reason, unless the 
reasons for a deviation from a quantity are spelled out or outlined in a 
clear usage, the court should be more wary about intervening to interpret 
the quantity term in a broad fashion because it is hard to see how judicial 
intervention by incorporation of the "flexibility" usage would advance the 
parties' goals. 
In many cases, however, trade usages and practices should govern. 
Requiring parties, however, to opt into such usages ex mzte-rhe textualists' 
suggestion to opting out of the ordinary meaning default-will present 
problems. Because the range of contextual evidence currently includes a 
broad spectrum of proof including course of performance, course of dealing 
and usage of trade and because the parties may have different preferences 
on admissibility corresponding with different types of context evidence, 
parties might be reluctant to opt into all types of context evidence even if 
they want some types of trade practices to govern. Thus, determining what 
types of context evidence to include and what types to exclude, would 
force parties to incur large specification costs. 
In addition, even if parties are given the option of opting into trade 
practices that constrain such behavior, they may be reluctant to do so 
because in some instances they may not want them to govern contract 
interpretation. The consequence of failing to opt into all trade meanings 
under the Schwartz and Scott approach is that the parties are bound by 
general ordinary meaning. However, insistence on a generalized ordinary 
meaning may facilitate opportunistic behavior which is something parties ex 
a11te would want to control. The majoritarian linguistic default rule will fail 
to control the discretion of the panies. If a majoritarian linguistic default 
leaves the parties' discretion unconstrained, it will foster opportunism, 
increase deadweight losses, and deter contracting ex ante. 
An example of opportunistic behavior that would be facilitated by 
a majoritiarian default would be where there is clearly a private trade 
meaning that all parties in the industry are familiar with and which they 
would therefore presume to be part of any contract. After the contract is 
entered into, one party insists on an ordinary non-trade meaning as a means 
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of gaining a private advantage that was not bargained for. For example, if 
everyone in the trade adheres to a custom in which 49.5% is treated as 
equivalent to 50%, a party arguing that 49.5% is a breach under the literal 
ordinary meaning of 50% or would entitle them to a lower price would be 
seeking to acquire an unbargained-for advantage. 176 
These two contrasting examples, one in which literal meaning can foster 
opportunism (interpreting 50% as 50%), and one in which a trade meaning 
could foster opportunism (70,000 means a flexible quantity), suggest that 
the appropriate approach is not to bar all trade meanings unless they are 
specifically invoked because this approach would foster opportunism in 
many cases. One must recognize that there are many types of trade usages 
and business practices. Because of transaction costs, it may be difficult for 
parties to identify all of the specific trade usages and practices that may be 
relevant. This prevents parties from efficiently opting into specific trade 
practices. 
At the same time, opting into the entire range of custom and course of 
dealing and trade practice as the only way to avoid the majority non-trade 
meaning would be problematic for parties because there are some instances 
in which the parties might not want the court to enforce a practice but 
might instead prefer a plain meaning approach. This is most likely to be 
the case when the parties want to adhere to or reject a course of dealing or 
course of performance based on information that might be available to the 
parties but not readily available to courts. Instances such as this occur in 
cases where parties agree on the sale of a fixed quantity of goods, and one 
party later argues that there is a trade usage, or history of dealing between 
the parties which suggests that the quantity terms are flexible. In these 
cases, one party will waive adherence to the literal terms of the contract 
and allow the other party to buy or sell a lesser amount of goods. Parties 
may be hesitant to opt into or out of such trade usages in the face of an "all 
or nothing" approach, because whether or not they want the trade usage 
enforced will depend on a variety of factors which are unknown ex ante. 
Such factors include whether or not the party seeking to invoke the trade 
usage is acting opportunistically, and whether making a concession is likely 
176 See, e.g., Hurst v. ].W. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627, 629 (Or. 1932). The marginal benefit 
in quality of the horsemeat from 49-S% to so% is not worth the cost that the producer would 
have to take to ensure that the meat was always at least so% protein, so the system builds in 
a little tolerance for error. If this trade usage were not in effect, horse meat would probably be 
a lot more expensive, as the producer would have to spend a lot more on monitoring costs to 
ensure that his product would not be rejected by the consumer. 
One would probably expect to see this issue to arise a lot in transactions involving high 
volumes of low cost goods (nails, screws, cement, feed, sand, and various grains and so forrh). 
With each of these goods the costs of ensuring complete compliance with a customer's 
specifications will likely outweigh the gains from producing them (since these are probably 
goods produced with a very low profit margin to begin with). 
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to generate enough repeat business to be cost justified. These matters 
seem to be particularly difficult for a court to judge177 and therefore there 
might be reason to insist on literalism as the best way of avoiding judicial 
errors. This factor would suggest literalism would be the better approach in 
the "flexible" quantity cases. 
Another problem with the default rule of ordinary meaning is that 
it suggests that unless parties have opted into a specialized meaning 
beforehand, it will not govern. Yet, there are many cases where the evidence 
of a private meaning is clear, adoption of the private meaning will best 
achieve the parties' goals, and permitting the private meaning to come 
in will not pose large unverifiable claims for the court or advance party 
opportunism. 
In In re Soper's Estate, 178 the court was confronted with a vexing 
interpretive language question involving the meaning of the word "wife." 
Under the terms of the relevant insurance policy, the proceeds were to be 
paid to the decedent's wife. After payment was made, it was discovered 
that the only lawful wife was not the person with whom the decedent 
had been living but instead his first wife whom he had abandoned under 
circumstances suggesting suicide. 179 
The legal wife challenged the payment to the non-wife. Under a plain 
meaning approach the legal wife would have prevailed on the theory that 
"wife" has only one meaning in a dictionary sense. 180 This result would 
have contravened the decedent's clear intention and the only parties to the 
contract were unaware that another legal wife actually existed. 181 
177 They would be unverifiable. 
17S In re Soper's Esrate, 264 N.W. 427 (Minn. 1935). 
179 !d. at 429. 
ISO !d. aq3 1. 
ISI A similar result was reached in a case when a court had to construe the meaning 
of the words "legal heirs" in a will. Although technically and literally, the word "legal heir" 
would include the wife, the court refused to construe the will in that manner. Instead, it indi-
cated that the construction should follow the testator's intent which the court concluded was 
to exclude the wife as a residuary devisee. The court rationalized the result by citing case law 
that provided that "though their technical significance is not to be overlooked, [such words] 
may, to give effect to the testator's intent, be held to refer to others than those who are techni-
cally heirs." In re Anderson's Estate, ISO N.W. 1019, 1020 (Minn. 1921). There would seem 
little danger that the collective good of words having a stock meaning that parties can rely on 
will be significantly jeopardized. Parties will continue tO rely on legal heirs to have a certain 
meaning but will also realize that when the drafter has manifested clearly an alternate mean-
ing, that meaning will govern, just as it did in the In re Soper case. If the court had overlooked 
the testator's intention and imposed a meaning at odds with that intention, there would be a 
much greater negative effect on parties planning transactions. If a party has a clear intention 
that is at odds with the objective or technical meaning, the court should honor that intention 
because it can do so without causing most parties to ignore the technical meaning. That will 
still continue to govern in the vast majority of cases. 
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In cases like Soper, where no party is misled, and the evidence of a private 
meaning is clear to everyone who was a party to the contract, the burden on 
the court of judging the parties' intentions is low. 182 In addition, there is no 
reason to believe that insistence on a private meaning is fictional or would 
otherwise promote opportunistic behavior, and there is no reason to believe 
that insistence on plain meaning will provide an incentive for developing a 
stock of default terms that parties can rely on in future contracts that would 
not otherwise be a vailable. 183 In short, given the low cost of ascertaining 
the parties' intentions, there would seem to be no reason to insist on plain 
meaning. 184 
The textualists would argue that the danger of permitting an 
idiosyncratic meaning is that it deprives future parties of autonomy "who 
subsequently use the term wife to refer to the person to whom they are 
legally married." 185 
Yet, it would seem that in most cases where a husband has abandoned 
a wife and been living apart for a great length of time in circumstances 
suggesting suicide, he would want the woman with whom he was living 
currently to benefit. Determining the parties' actual meaning "involves 
the greatest benefits" as an interpretive strategy186 because it allows the 
court to determine the actual meaning. Because in the Soper case the 
I 82 This invocation of a specialized private meaning known to the two parties who were 
involved in the contract, the insurance company and the partners in the business, is akin to 
courts relying on evidence of a secret code that is not contested by parties to the contract. 
See CORBIN ON CoNTRACTS§ 24.8 at s6 (indicating that "both Judge Easterbrook and Judge 
Posner ... have recognized that courts will enforce secret meanings to which the contracting 
parties have mutually assented"}. 
183 Goetz & Scott, supra note 17, at 316 (discussing value of adherence to plain mean-
ing in increasing "the supply of officially recognized invocations .... ") Once parties invoke 
an idiosyncratic, non-standard meaning and the court allows the admissibility of evidence of 
that non-standard meaning, then all parties in the future are disadvantaged because they are 
no longer able to count on a court giving effect to the standard, plain meaning of the word 
"wife," for example. The court often insists on adherence to plain meaning where one party is 
insisting on a private, unmanifested intention that diverges from the objective plain meaning 
of a word or term of a contract. The court insists on plain meaning in part to prevent the great 
uncertainty that would arise if parties could plead private intentions that were not obvious 
to the other party. In the Soper case, allowing one party to plead that his private intention 
diverges from the plain meaning does not disadvantage a party who relied on the objective 
plain meaning. 
I84 The argument that interpreting the word wife to refer to the non-legal wife will 
"diminish the autonomy of all contractors who subsequently use the word 'wife' to refer to 
the woman to whom they are legally married," KRAUS & ScoTT, supra note 38, at 656, seems 
inapt since courts would have no reason to depart from the ordinary plain meaning of the word 
"wife" unless the evidence were clear that a different meaning were intended. Thus, in the 
vast majority of cases, courts will have no reason to depart from the ordinary meaning. 
185 !d. Public policy concerns might dictate an overturning of the contractual choice 
despite the interpretation to mean the non-legal wife. 
I 86 Posner, supra note 3, at I 590. 
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evidence of the intended meaning was overwhelmingly clear, and there 
would be low costs associated with courts giving effect to such intention in 
that case, the court should give effect to what the parties actually meant. 187 
For the vast majority of parties, who are living with and legally married to 
their spouses, the designation of the word wife in a legal document will 
pose no interpretive problems and cause no uncertainty nor increase the 
unpredictability of all common words in contract. Parties can continue to 
rely on the word wife to connote legal wife. However, requiring all parties 
to abide by that meaning sets up the possibility that a non-advantaged, 
non-intended party would be given an opportunistic windfall and the only 
advantage for future parties would be to make available the stock of words 
having an ordinary meaning ("wife") when in fact the stock of such words 
with ordinary meaning is already available to all parties. 
The other problem with adopting an ordinary meaning interpretation is 
that it could foster opportunism in many types of cases that do not involve 
a term of art but a phrase describing a party's performance obligation. 
Because these descriptions are inevitably incomplete, a linguistic default 
in favor of "ordinary" meaning will result in the court interpreting each 
word literally, but in a way that does not and cannot solve the real problem 
of how to control opportunistic behavior. Thus, in all instances in which 
contracts are incomplete in failing to control behavior, a linguistic default 
of ordinary meaning will be a misguided one that will not maximize gains 
from trade. 
Often the parties face uncertainty about each other's propensity for 
opportunism. One party inevitably may have discretion about how to act 
under a contract because that party will have to make choices during the 
performance of the contract. Often nothing will be said in the contract 
that specifically controls that behavior and discretion. Yet, courts routinely 
admit trade usages when they have been developed to curb opportunism 
and when costs of enforcing such usage are low because the judicial ability 
to judge and verify the opportunism is easy. Thus, courts confronting the 
interpretive issue of what language governs should not adopt a linguistic 
default of ordinary meaning. Instead, a certain taxonomy of factors should 
be part of the decision of what interpretive rules should govern the 
interpretive process and whether courts should incorporate trade usages as 
a means of curbing opportunism both in deciding what language governs 
and in deciding how much extrinsic evidence to admit. 
187 In fact, as Professor Chirelstein poinrs out, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 
20 l ( 1) approach would be consistent with the Soper result. Where both parties clearly intend 
a certain meaning, the Restatement indicates that the private meaning should prevail even if 
it is at odds with the ordinary meaning of the word. See CHJRELSTEIN, supra note 40, at 94· 
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VI. METHODOLOGY 
A theory of interpretation of contracts must first address questions of 
incompleteness. Incompleteness makes an interpretive approach built 
on a minimum evidentiary base problematic. In fact, if one analyzes the 
different kinds of extrinsic evidence, it becomes clear that the incorporation 
of certain types of evidence for interpretation would reduce rather than 
increase the moral hazard problem, while simultaneously minimizing 
error costs. This is especially true with respect to certain types of trade 
usages that are specifically designed to control opportunistic behavior, or 
create terms of art within a particular industry. If a contract is economically 
incomplete and it can be shown that the cost of judicial incorporation of 
non-express terms, either terms of art, objective reasonableness limitations 
on meaning, or trade practices designed to control opportunism into the 
contract is less costly than the private strategies for overcoming these 
barriers, the extrinsic evidence should be admitted. 188 If legal intervention 
admitting the extrinsic evidence under a default rule incorporating trade 
usages would accord with the parties' objectives, and there is a large social 
cost in excluding the evidence, the law should intervene and admit the 
evidence. The social costs courts should consider in making their decision 
include whether failure to admit extrinsic evidence would lead to an 
increase in opportunism and a concomitant decrease in contracting, whether 
such failure would increase the transaction costs of screening and drafting 
contracts, and whether other private devices to control behavior (such as 
reputational sanctions) are more costly or ineffective. Doing so would help 
to achieve the goals of controlling moral hazard while minimizing the costs 
of such control. 
This approach is consistent with Coase's admonition that "[t]he 
existence of transaction costs will lead those who wish to trade to engage 
in practices which bring about a reduction of transaction costs whenever 
the loss suffered in other ways from the adoption of those practices is less 
than the transaction costs saved." 189 Translated, this means that if there 
will be costs associated with uncontrolled moral hazard or opportunism (a 
type of transaction cost), then parties who want to reduce such costs as 
a goal will adopt certain practices to control such costs when those costs 
(including judicial error costs from a more active interpretive methodology) 
are less than the losses that would otherwise accrue from uncontrolled 
opportunism. 
Professor Ronald Coffey then extends Coase's analysis to cover cases 
where there are conditions that might make it costly for the parties to control 
I 88 See Kos[ri[sky, s11pra nO[e I 02, a[ 654. 
I89 RoNALD CoASE, ThE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAw 7 (I990). 
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the hazard problems because of a "budget constraint" 190 and provides a 
model for analyzing when one can be certain that a legal intervention that 
would apply to the interpretive issue of whether incorporation of a default 
rule should incorporate trade practices might provide positive net benefits 
and improve welfare for the parties themselves and society. Such a model 
would ask "(1) why the parties would be expected to get to that point (a 
model that makes assumptions about what objectives of parries are and how 
persons go about seeking those objectives, on average) and (2) why they 
did not get there (a model that makes certain assumptions about barriers, 
conjectured noninterventionist ways of surmounting those barriers [private 
devices], the costs of using each type of surmounting mechanism, and a 
conclusion that the costs exceeded the expected benefits." 191 
Under this model, one might argue that the goals of contract 
interpretation are larger than the goal of "creat[ing] a contract that a court 
will interpret in a predictable way." 192 Instead, the goal of the parries is to 
achieve their goal of maximizing joint gain while minimizing transaction 
costs. In some instances, where the parties operate on the basis of private 
assumptions that create a private meaning and a reluctance to disclose 
one's status as a bigamist, but one's intentions were clear that the word wife 
meant the non-legal wife, one can argue that forcing the party with the 
unusual marriage status to use plain meaning in a dictionary sense would 
defeat the parties' intentions, a great cost, without significantly increasing 
the predictability of common words in the future. Instead one can surmise 
only that if the intentions of all parties to the contract were clear, no one 
was misled as to who was intended, the court will permit a private meaning 
to govern. Parties who want their legal wives to take property will not have 
to work very hard to have the court recognize their entitlement given the 
ordinary meaning of wife. 
If one can determine that these conditions for intervention are met, 
that the parties did not achieve a contract that expressly controlled all 
behavioral opportunism, that certain obstacles including uncertainty about 
future behavior might interfere with contractual solutions, that the parties 
would seek to reduce that risk as a means of maximizing gains from trade, 
that reputational sanctions might fail, that private alternative means of 
controlling opportunism such as pre-screening for opportunism or seeking 
bonds to cover post-contract chiseling are costly, then a broad interpretive 
judicial approach might be a superior way of controlling opportunism while 
minimizing the burden on parties of negotiating individual arrangements 
to control such behavior. 
190 E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Universiry, w 
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve Universiry (July 16, 1996, 13:37 
EST) (on file with author}. 
191 ld. 
192 Goetz&Scott,sllpronote l],at301. 
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A Willistonian approach limiting extrinsic evidence, what Schwartz 
and Scott refer to as the truncated evidentiary base, may still continue to 
be appropriate in certain cases, particularly where the parties choose to 
refrain from expressly incorporating a practice for certain reasons. If they 
omit the practice in order to retain the flexibility to adhere to, or deviate 
from, a practice depending on information that will (1) only be available 
later on, and (2) may be difficult for a court to verify, then a court should 
be wary about admitting the evidence. 193 These cases often involve a class 
in which one party waives insistence on adherence to the strict terms of a 
contract and the benefited party then seeks to bind the acquiescing party 
to a contractual charge that is binding in all future cases. 
These cases typify the paradigm case that prompted the Schwartz and 
Scott criticism of broad interpretive methodologies. Yet there are reasons 
why the waiver cases (waiving a fixed quantity term and making it flexible 
in light of trade practice) should not be grounds for broad interpretation. 
First, where the usage takes the form of an accommodation, the parties may 
have omitted the practice from the contract because they want to await 
further information and that information might be more readily accessible to 
the parties than to a court. Courts also seem to be hesitant to enforce trade 
usages when it appears as though doing so will simply shift the potential 
for one-sided opportunism from one party to another, and do nothing to 
eliminate it. 194 
However, the Willistonian approach should not constitute the general 
default rule for all interpretation questions in contract law since there are 
many types of cases in which admitting extrinsic evidence will be the best 
and perhaps the lowest cost means to constrain opportunism and prevent 
a deadweight loss. 195 
Professor Ben-Shahar has raised other arguments against the "erosion" 
rules that result when courts interpret a parry's tolerance of a one time 
breach or waiver as creating a new rule that will waive future breaches and 
make insistence on adherence to the stipulated performance problematic. 
This effect will lead parties to insist on stricter adherence to the express 
obligations, an effect known as the "rigidity effect." 196 However, he finds that 
the substantive rules on erosion may not matter under certain conditions 
since there will be offsetting effects that the law permits. 197 This article is 
suggesting that the reason parties may have omitted expressly incorporating 
I 93 Koscritsky, supra note 54, at 459· 
194 !d. at so8. 
195 ELLICKSON, supra note 22, at 172-173· 
196 Omri Ben-Shahar, The Te11tative Case AgaiNst Flexibility i11 Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 781, 784 (1999). 
197 Under conditions of imperfect information and monitoring and costly enforcement, 
an erosion rule of the Code will make parties worse off. !d. at 809-812. 
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these types of practices into an express contract may suggest caution m 
using these practices to interpret meaning. 
VII. HEURISTICS 
In this penultimate section I suggest a series of heuristics that are derived 
from a close examination of a large number of interpretation cases. I am 
sensitive to the fact that others before me, Professors Craswell, Hermalin 
and Katz 198 have suggested their own heuristics. This article's suggested 
heuristics may help to shape the debate about when textualist and when 
formalist interpretation will achieve the parties' goals including the goals of 
curbing opportunism and achieving other goals. 
(I) Whether a judicial interpretation for one party would foster counter-
opportunism by the other party. Colttmbia Nitrogen is a good example of a 
fact pattern in which admission of evidence of the flexible quantity trade 
usage would possibly promote counter-opportunism. If the court were to 
allow the defendant to offer evidence that a fixed quantity actually meant a 
flexible quantity, 199 that usage would give one party the discretion to order 
more or less depending on which action would be more advantageous 
given the price, which would subject the other party to strategic behavior. 200 
Courts do and should strive to avoid an interpretation that will foster 
counter-opportunism. 
(2) The transaction costs of controlling the matter through express 
contracting. If the matter, such as t~e one involving behavioral opportunism 
under conditions of uncertainty, is resistant to a contractual solution, the 
absence of an express term does not signal that the parties would not 
want the court to intervene. Rather, it may indicate that cost barriers 
prevented the parties from negotiating an optimal solution ex ante, leaving 
the question of whether the court could improve welfare by intervening. 
That may depend in part on assessing whether the parties could solve the 
198 See supra note 31. 
199 The court admitted such evidence in Columbia Nitrogen on appeal. See supra note 
175· 
200 Div. of TripleT Serv. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. Westchester 
County 1969) is another example of a possible favorable decision promoting counter-oppor-
tunism. In Triple T the contract terms permitted termination of a dealer contract on 90 days 
notice. The plaintiff wanted the court to interpret that provision to forbid termination except 
for cause on the basis of trade practices. If the court interpreted the contract by admitting such 
evidence, it might simply shift the potential for opportunism from one party (the dealer) to 
another party (the franchisee). That is because the party seeking to rely on custom and usage 
might subject the franchisor to a risk that it did not bargain for, namely the risk of the court 
judging on non-verifiable matters, such as whether there was cause for termination. 
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problem at low cost ex post with a renegotiation. 201 When one party has 
invested sunk costs, for example, the problem of hold up may interfere 
with ex post renegotiation, at least in the sense that the hold up problem 
will act as a disincentive for parties to make investments and so will have 
negative efficiency consequences. The vulnerability to hold up may make 
ex post renegotiation impossible. When ex ante and ex post solutions are 
difficult, a court should consider intervening after an assessment of other 
non-court solutions. Courts should also carefully assess whether the 
parties have other alternative informal mechanisms outside of contract to 
control the opportunism problem either through bonding, screening, or 
reputational sanctions. The court must consider the cost of private strategies 
that would have to be entered into with each successive transaction w 
control opportunism and weigh those aggregate costs against the court's 
intervemion w police opporrunism on an occasional basis through active 
-interpretive methods. 
(3) and (4) The nature of the trade practice and the burden on the court. 
The nature of the practice itself may provide some indication of whether 
the court should use it to interpret the contract. In some cases, as in a trade 
usage which treats 49.5% as equal to 50% or a baker's dozen as equal to 13, 
the trade usage itself is not one that applies only in a narrow subset of cases 
nor would it be hard for a court to judge when the usage applies and to what 
contexts. It is simply an on/off determination. 202 If the usage exists and is 
a term of art, one party's insistence on a contrary plain meaning is likely 
to indicate opportunistic behavior and a desire to escape from a meaning 
that both parties were aware of and assumed would govern contracrual 
obligations. Courts strive to avoid this result by interpreting contracts 
in light of trade usages, particularly those that do not require complex 
determinations by a court,203 and in doing so curb opportunistic behavior 
by parties insisting on plain meaning to avoid contractually assumed risks. 
201 Katz, supra note 9, at 528 (discussing specific facwrs that might raise costs ex post 
including asymmetry of information and idiosyncratic transactions). 
202 The presence of such on/off determinations may mitigate the concern on one scholar 
that parties will invest ex post "w turn the bargain in their favor." Katz, supra note 9, at 530. 
Katz is worried that substantive interpretation may facilitate parties overspending on litiga-
tion w produce a favorable interpretation. !d. Where the determination is an easy on/off one 
in which the term of art governs or it does not apply, then there may be less incentive w invest 
in resources than if the case turned on complex factual determinations (such as whether there 
was just cause w terminate a franchisee). 
203 These complex determinations may involve determining whether the trade usage 
should be admitted for interpretive purposes or whether it should be excluded because it con-
flicts with express language. These are likely w prove nettlesome when the express language 
says something specific, such as a fixed quantity, and the usage detracts from the settled, 
specific nature of that quantiry by making it flexible. The question arises whether the parties, 
by adopting a specific quantity, meant through the express language w exclude the usage 
allowing for flexibility. In the baker's dozen case, the admissibility of the practice is less prob-
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(5) Whether a broad interpretation would operate to control discretion that 
would otherwise remain uncontrolled under a literalistic interpretation. 
Courts readily opt for a broad interpretation admitting extrinsic evidence 
or invoking reasonableness when doing so will control discretion by a 
party. Because uncontrolled discretion is a threat to bargains and control 
of opportunism will therefore increase joint gains, parties ex aJlte will want 
to control discretion. If other strategies such as contract clauses are too 
costly, parties might rely on reputational and other informal sanctioning 
mechanisms. However, where the conditions for self-enforcement are not 
robust (because of poor informational networks) or where the rewards from 
opportunism are particularly great in relation to the reputational cost,Z0.J the 
court may play a constructive role through actively interpreting contracts 
to preclude opportunism. They may do so almost as a court of equity 
would without creating a pre-announced default rule to govern all cases. 205 
This approach can be seen in the airplane maintenance case where the 
court admitted evidence to control the lessee's discretion in performing 
contractually mandated maintenance. 
(6) Whether literal interpretation would leave one party vulnerable after 
having invested large sunk costs. Courts are willing to broadly interpret 
contracts and to add terms when one party has invested sunk costs that 
would be lost under a narrow interpretation. The Gorrf2.06 court added a 
term obligating one party to pay a mold removal fee despite the absence 
of any contract term obligating the party to pay such a fee. The court's 
interpretation served to protect a party whose large engineering sunk costs 
would be unrecoverable unless the court implied a term.207 
(7) Whether one party would receive an unbargained-for (unanticipated) 
windfall that could be avoided by a broad, non-literal interpretation. Of 
course, the windfall issue is a complex one since not all windfalls should 
be deterred through the interpretation process. Ervay, Inc., v. Wood/08 a 
lemaric because the baker's dozen would simply apply in every case where the word dozen 
was mentioned. One would nor have ro figure our whether, by using rhe word dozen, they 
meant ro exclude the trade usage of a baker's dozen or not. In every case where one dozen is 
mentioned, the baker's dozen would automatically be substituted. 
204 See supra note I 26. 
205 Email from Robert E. Scott, Professor of Law, Columbia University, co Juliet P. 
Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University Law School (February II, 
2004) (on file with author). 
206 See supra note I42. 
. 207 See also U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter Commc'ns Inc., 875 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. I989) 
(mrerprering the word "publish" to permit early publication of the paperback edition but not 
early sales; otherwise large sunk costs in the hardcover edition would be lost and courts will 
avo1d an interpretation that allows such a loss). 
208 Ervay, Inc. v. Wood, 3 73 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). 
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case not discussed in this article, illustrates when a court will intervene 
to police windfalls and opportunism through interpretation. In Ervay the 
court had to construe the waiver of a lessee to a condemnation award to be 
received by the lessor for property owned by the lessor and condemned. 
Ex ante the parties had contemplated the condemnation of Tract A but 
it turned out that the government condemned other tracts of the leased 
land. The waiver by the lessee seemed general in nature but if the waiver 
were broadly construed to include all leased tracts, the lessee would lose 
the value of all improvements on the other tracts and lessor would gain an 
unexpected windfall. The court admitted extrinsic evidence to conclude 
that the waiver should be narrowly construed to apply only to Tract A. 
That interpretation avoided the lessor opportunistically appropriating 
the value of the lessee's sunk costs when the lessee and the lessor had 
apparently shared an understanding that the lessee would only stand to 
lose investments on Tract A which both parties assumed was the only land 
that would possibly be condemned. 
(8) Whether a secret code exists that is at odds with plain meaning and 
the code can be translated at low cost. If there is an idiosyncratic meaning 
but clear evidence of the meaning that can be ascertained at low cost, the 
court will admit the evidence and broadly interpret the contract. By doing 
so, they give effect to the mutually intended meaning. To do otherwise 
would give one party an opportunistic windfall by giving it the benefit of 
a plain meaning that the parties did not contemplate ex ante. Interpreting 
against such a result curbs a form of opportunism-giving the party a better 
bargain than that which the contract provided. 
(9) Is the admissibility of the evidence likely to embroil the court in 
difficult to decide complex issues of whether the evidence shows the 
practice is one of legal right or of one of grace and intended to remain legally 
unenforceable? Because these matters are likely to depend on information 
that will arise ex post and parties rather than judges are best equipped to 
judge, courts should be wary about broadly interpreting contracts to include 
such practices. The Columbia Nitrogen case is illustrative of this situation 
and it is one in which the heuristic suggests that parties should be wary of 
such interpretation since if proved, it would afford unlimited discretion to 
one party. Without limits on the discretion, it would seem unlikely that the 
court's interpretation would be value maximizing. 
(10) The robustness of non-legal sanctions. The court should be more 
willing to actively interpret contracts if the other means of policing against 
opportunism appear more costly either because the express contract 
solution would be expensive or there is no active trade association that is 
engaged in policing and information supply. 
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CoNCLUSION 
This article has suggested that theories about judicial interpretation 
cannor be artificially separated from the question of what courts should 
do when a contract is incomplete. The new formalists separate those 
issues by assuming that interpretation issues necessarily involve complete 
contracts "for the subjects at issue" in which "[c]ourts can only interpret 
what is said." 209 Because all contracts are incomplete, whether the court 
is interpreting a contract or supplying a default rule for a true gap, the 
grounds on which the state is intervening is the key methodological issue. 
Both interpretation and gap filling depend on an assessment of "how the 
parties would have resolved the issue ... had they foreseen it when they 
negotiated their contract." 210 That assessment must depend on the costs 
of judicial intervention, including error costs, as well as the benefits of such 
intervention, including the control of opportunistic behavior. 
When the question of justification for a state supplied default rule is 
separated from the wide ranging contexts in which a court can "interpret" 
an incomplete contract211 and the functional role that broad interpretation 
can serve in curbing hazards and controlling discretion, the case for judicial 
intervention in interpretive questions may seem less than compelling. 
This is especially so when the state-supplied default rules discussed by 
Schwartz and Scott as the typical judicial responses to the incomplete 
contract problems are general default standards that many parties contract 
around. 212 The proclivity of many parties to contract around some state-
sponsored defaults under the Uniform Commercial Code, such as the default 
rules "requiring parties to behave 'reasonably,' 'conscionably,' 'fairly,' and 
in 'good faith,'" 213 however, does not resolve whether broad approaches to 
interpretation will be value maximizing in settings involving incomplete 
contracts. 
This article suggests that the question for courts is whether, when a 
contract is incomplete, a court should interpret it using a broad range of 
evidence or whether parties would be likely to contract out of a default rule 
of contextualized interpretation. There is no single answer to that question. 
Optimal interpretation will depend on whether judicial interpretation 
and use of certain evidence will constrain or increase moral hazard, will 
effectuate the parries' intentions, will require the court to assess factors 
that the parties are better able to evaluate and on whether a customary 
trade practice that can reduce the burden on the court for deciding if 
opportunism has occurred exists. If there are structural factors that can 
209 Schwartz & Scotr, supra note 2 I, at 594· 
2IO Posner, s11pra note 3, at I586. 
2 I 1 Schwartz & Scott, s11pro note 2 I, at 594· 
212 ld. 
213 ld. at 601. 
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help identify opportunistic behavior to a court, such as the expropriation 
of a sunk cost by the non-investing party, as in the case involving the 
removal of the cost to engineer plastic molds, and trade usages that serve as 
objective indicators of opportunism, courts may be good at judging whether 
opportunism has occurred ex post. 214 If opportunism is presumed to be a 
widespread phenomenon, this approach of admitting extrinsic evidence if 
it will curb opportunism will satisfy the Schwartz and Scott criteria for an 
effective default rule-that it be simple and "efficient for a wide variety of 
contract parties." 215 
214 I am grateful ro RoberE E. Scmt for raising this point. 
215 Schwartz & Scon, supra note 21, at 598. 
